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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of policy towards the creative industries in the 
UK in the period 1997-2008. It argues that this can be seen in the light of New Labour's 
understanding of the knowledge economy, an understanding that influenced its 
development of education and social policy, as well as economic policy. It thus 
provides a unique insight into New Labour politics in general. 
The thesis asserts that New Labour's account of the knowledge economy was a 
deterministic one, which took its cue from what it believed to be long-term social and 
economic trends. In this, it is consistent with other critiques of New Labour politics, 
which argue that it can be seen as a development of prevailing neoliberal ideas 
(Hay 1999; Thompson 2002; Finlayson 2003; Clarke 2004); but in this case, I argue, it is a 
variety of neoliberalism that is heavily influenced by institutionalism (Bevir 2005). The 
importance of institutionalist ideas can be seen in the emphasis in creative industries 
policy on networks, characterised by social and ethical norms, as opposed to a 
neoliberal focus purely on marketisation. 
New Labour produced an essentially benign account of the knowledge economy; 
the creative industries were capable of producing 'good work', which offered 
opportunities for highly skilled labour. In addition, because of its links to popular 
culture, they could offer inclusion through work, for those deemed socially excluded. 
I argue that this account continued throughout the period under examination, 
despite mounting evidence, discussed in several of the publications below, that the 
creative industries produce labour markets that are highly unequal in terms of race 
and class. It is in attitudes to the labour market that the failures of New Labour's 
creative industries policy can be seen most sharply. The roots of that failure, and what 
it tells us about New Labour's creative industries policy, is the subject of the thesis. 
V 
1. Introduction 
The publications collected here, together with the commentary, investigate the 
development of New Labour' creative industries policy over the period 1997-2008. At 
the time of writing, the New Labour government is still in office and the creative 
industries a live discourse, 2 but in order to impose some structure on the commentary, 
I have chosen these dates, which take us from the election of New Labour in 1997 to 
the publication of Creative Britain and its immediate aftermath (DCMS 2008). 3 
As Hesmondhalgh (2005: 96) has commented, not only are media and other forms of 
cultural policy rarely considered together, but what often seems to be forgotten is 
that 'these are areas of public policy more generally'. This thesis examines creative 
industries policy as public policy and seeks to relate it to the politics of New Labour in 
general, and particularly to its view on what came to be called the knowledge 
economy (Lash and Urry 1994; Department of Trade and Industry 1998; Jessop 2002; 
Thrift 2005; Cruddas 2006). 
This, I argue, developed as an over-arching account of not only economic but also 
social changes, which New Labour used as the basis for its creative industry polices 
(see Section 5). The publications presented here discuss some of the failings of those 
policies (see Oakley 2004a, 2006,2009a, 2009c), and this commentary reflects on the 
relationship between those failings and New Labour's understanding of the 
knowledge economy. 
As this is a PhD by prior publication, I have selected those publications which I feel 
best articulate this narrative. The publications were not originally intended to be part 
of a PhD submission, and therefore sometimes deal with material outside the primary 
argument of my thesis. 
II have used the term 'New Labour' to refer to the government of 1997-2010, while recognising 
that this is not the official name of the British Labour Party. Nonetheless, 'New Labour' is 
politically significant, as Tony Blair articulated after the General Election in May 1997, when he 
said, 'we ran for office as new Labour, we will govern as new Labour'. When used by Labour 
politicians, the term is often associated with an appeal to middle-class voters, as when used by 
Gordon Brown in early 2010. See http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l /hi/8462887. stm, retrieved 23 February 
2010. 
2 Having said this, 'retrospectives' are already being published, such as the 2009 special issue of the International Journal of Cultural Policy, entitled 'After the Creative Industries'. 
3 Several of the academic publications referred to here, including my own, were published in 
2009, but refer to these slightly earlier dates. DCMS refers to Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, throughout. 
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This commentary seeks to do two things: to give an account of my own work and its 
development, and thus to place it within the discourse of creative industries; and to 
provide a theoretical account of the relationship between these publications, which 
deal with the creative industries, and New Labour politics. The rest of Section 1 deals 
primarily with definitional issues, as a way of clearing the ground before stating the 
hypothesis in Section 2. 
Section 3 explores with my own background and role in the creative industries. This is 
necessary in a PhD by prior publication, where claims about originality and 
contribution to knowledge rest, to some degree, on the writer's role in the discourse, 
including responses to their work. 
Section 4 looks at how the creative industries are articulated in official policy 
statements, academic research and grey literature. 4 As one of the publications 
submitted is a literature review (Oakley 2009b), and other publications (e. g., Oakley 
2009a) cover the relevant literature, there is less coverage of academic literature in 
this commentary than may otherwise be the case in a PhD by publication 
commentary. 
Sections 5 and 6 present the case for linking the creative industries to New Labour's 
account of the knowledge economy and, as such, form the core argument of the 
commentary and the thesis overall. 
Section 7 briefly discusses the publications submitted, their provenance and criteria 
for inclusion. 
Section 8 deals with the implications of this research and the direction of my future 
research in the field. 
Section 9 comprises the publications themselves. 
4 The term 'grey literature' refers to literature found outside conventional publishing channels. In 
this instance, it refers to the large number of strategies, research papers, think-pieces and 
advocacy documents produced on the creative industries, often by consultants, many of 
which are unpublished. It does not cover all policy publications, some of which are published by TSO/HMSO. 
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1.1 Definitions 
Writing about creative industries policy can be fraught with terminological 
inexactitude and shifting meanings (Schlesinger 2009a), so it is necessary to clarify the 
use of terms where possible. 
'Policy' can be thought of as consisting of a number of different techniques, including 
legislation, regulation and funding. This is an approach I have adopted from Jessop's 
work on what he calls 'cultural political economy' (Jessop 2005), which I find helpful in 
understanding creative industries policy because of the variety of state and non-state 
actors involved, and the importance of social relations between them. In keeping 
with this, I do not distinguish between 'policy' as a set of statements and 
'implementation' as a set of actions, believing that both are structured by a set of 
beliefs. These beliefs may, of course, differ over time and produce different emphases, 
but those differences are not explained by the distinction between policy and 
implementation. 
Unlike some areas of cultural policy, such as broadcasting, creative industries policy 
has consisted largely of funding decisions and the creation of new agencies, 
networks and partnerships, or what Jessop calls 'the organisation of the conditions for 
self-organisation' (Jessop 2005: 159). 'Policymakers' can therefore refer to those in 
central government charged with developing policy statements, and those in the 
plethora of regional and local agencies responsible for advice and implementation. 
By 'knowledge economy' I mean the by-now commonplace notion that the 
generation of new ideas and knowledge is the key to competitiveness in developed 
economies. It is sometimes referred to as a knowledge-based economy. Other 
cognate terms such as information society, network society and new economy have 
at various times been used to cover much the same ground. There are subtle 
differences between these notions, but what they have in common is that they can 
be seen as a response to the post-war crisis in Fordist production and the Keynesian 
welfare state (Jessop 2002). Creative Industries, as I will argue, were seen by New 
Labour as an archetypal knowledge economy sector, because of their dependence 
on new ideas and highly skilled labour. 
Also important for this thesis is Jessop's argument (2002) that knowledge economies 
are characterised by a tight coupling of social and economic policy, which often 
subordinates social policy to the demands of a flexible and enterprising workforce, or 
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as I will argue in this case, sees these interests as one and the same (see Sections 5.5 
and 6, below). 
The term 'creative industries' properly applies to the 13 creative industry sectors, so 
designated by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS 1998). 5 The 
omission of important areas of publicly funded cultural provision, such as museums, 
libraries and the heritage sector, has been noted (Selwood 2002). But in practice, at 
the level of local authorities or regional development agencies (RDAs), libraries, 
museums and heritage were often involved in policy discussions (DCMS 2004,2007, 
2008; SHIPs 2008). 6 
At the same time, the term 'cultural industries' continues to be used, particularly in 
academia, though it is often taken to refer primarily to the media industries, or what 
Hesmondhalgh calls the 'core cultural industries' (2002: 12). 7 My own preference for 
'cultural industries' means that I often use it as a synonym for creative industries in the 
publications submitted here. For me, the term is more accurate, in that it is the cultural 
or symbolic nature of these goods and services that is distinctive. 
Debates about the 'culturisation' of the economy have been ongoing since the early 
1990s (Amin 1994; Lash and Urry 1994) and have led some to argue that terms like 
cultural or creative industries are no longer useful, as certain characteristics 
- 
the 
importance of innovation, knowledge, branding and so on 
- 
are widespread across 
the whole economy. Here, the terms 'creative economy' or 'cultural economy' are 
often posited as being more helpful (Andari et al. 2007). However, as Miller (2009) has 
recently argued, while slogans such as 'everything is political' may be accurate, they 
are not particularly useful as guides to analysis or action. Policy for the creative 
industries requires something to act upon, and while the designated creative industry 
5 The list includes advertising, architecture, the arts and antique market, crafts, design, designer 
fashion, film, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software, 
television and radio. Close 'economic inter-relationship' with tourism, hospitality, museums and 
galleries, and the heritage sector was also noted (DCMS 1998: 3). 
6 An example of this would be the 'Living Places' programme run by the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), together with five cultural agencies, the Arts Council, Sport England and the 
Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), as well as heritage in the form of 
English Heritage and the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council. The idea was to grow 
cultural and sports provision in line with housing growth, where cultural provision expressly 
includes the creative industries alongside arts, sport, heritage, museums, libraries and archives, 
and the built environment. See http: //www. living-places. org. uk/about-living-places, retrieved 
17 November 2009. 
7 The significance of the shift from cultural to creative industries has been widely debated in 
academic circles. See, for example, Gamham 2005; Pratt 2005; O'Connor 2007; it is also 
discussed in Oakley 2006 and 2009c. 
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sub-sectors are far from ideal, it seems necessary to set some boundaries around 
these activities, both for policymaking and analysis. 
Over time, the preferred designation, at least for policymakers, appears to have 
become 'cultural and creative industries', a term enshrined in agencies such as the 
creative and cultural industry skills agency (CCSkills) or Creativity, Culture and 
Education, the post-2009 name for the education programme previously known as 
Creative Partnerships. 8 The publications presented here deal with the 'cultural and 
creative' industries, that is, the creative industries together with museums and the 
heritage sector. 
1.2. Inclusions and Exclusions 
This thesis examines creative industries policy as an example of New Labour public 
policy. Given this, the focus is primarily on the UK, though some of the publications 
make reference to work conducted outside the UK (particularly Oakley 2009a, 2009b). 
As Mulholland (2008) notes, the official terminology is slippery here. Creative 'Britain' 
(DCMS 2008), in fact, contains policy prescriptions that apply primarily to England. 9 In 
the period under consideration, devolution in the UK has resulted in different policy 
approaches in England, Wales and Scotland (Paterson 2003; Turok 2003; Allard 2007), 
though these developments are not considered directly in this commentary; 1° indeed, 
most of the consultancy work referred to below and in the publications took place in 
England. 
A charge of parochialism or 'metropolitanist bias' (Cunningham 2007: 348), is often 
made against those writing about creative industries purely in the UK context, and I 
accept the argument that the practices governing their development at an 
international level are diverse and cannot be read from the UK situation alone (Wang 
2004). My defence is that I make no claims that it can be. 
B Unlike 'cultural' to 'creative' industries, the move to 'cultural and creative industries' has not 
been widely commented on. My view is that it is largely pragmatic and designed to reassure 
those who feel that arts or heritage sectors are excluded from 'creative industries' 
-a 
necessary consideration when public agencies involved in the arts or heritage are offen actors 
in strategies for local creative industries. 
9 Discussion with T. Campbell on terms of reference for Creative Britain, personal email 
communication, 28 January 2010. 
10 Schlesinger (2009c) argues that even where administrative regimes are different, intellectual 
dependency is such that Scotland has simply absorbed the notion of the creative industries 
from London: 'Lacking originality, Scottish Labour imported New Labour policy and terminology 
without altering a comma or full stop' (19). 
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This thesis is not an examination of the effectiveness of policies on the 
competitiveness of creative industry sub-sectors (e. g., film, music, TV or videogames) 
or, even more fraught, on the 'quality' of products or services. I am not considering 
related policy areas such as intellectual property (IP) or the development of digital 
infrastructure (Hesmondhalgh 2009). 
Much creative industries policy is a development of earlier notions, particularly those 
around the restructuring of urban space (Scott 2000; Sassen 2001; Smith 2003; van 
Heur 2008) and the related area of cultural regeneration (Evans and Shaw 2004). This 
provides a background to several of the pieces submitted here (Oakley 2004a, 2006, 
2009a), but for reasons of space, it is not a focus of this commentary. 
Other related areas such as arts education (Bamford 2006; Oakley 2008), arts funding 
(Oakley 2006,2009a, 2009c) or evidence-based policymaking (Oakley 2004b) are 
considered in some of the publications, but this thesis is not an examination of these 
areas specifically. 
Having cleared some of the ground, the next section presents my hypothesis. 
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2. Statement of hypothesis 
The argument of this thesis is that New Labour's account of the knowledge economy 
determined its approach to creative industries policy. This account was essentially a 
sociological one, which took its cue from what were perceived to be long-term social 
and economic changes, as opposed to a political account, which would seek to 
shape and direct those changes (Finlayson 2003). This distinguishes creative industries 
from previous cultural industry polices, which took a more explicitly political view of 
the need to re-shape markets through public intervention. 
This argument reflects other critiques of New Labour politics, which claim that it can 
be seen as a development of prevailing neoliberal ideas'' (Hay 1999; Thompson 2002; 
Finlayson 2003; Clarke 2004,2005). The element of neoliberalism at issue here is the 
way it seeks to elide the 'market' with capitalism, and to present these as the natural, 
inexorable state of society (Mirowski 2009). This determines the apolitical approach to 
policymaking described above. But the particular development of neoliberalism 
represented by New Labour can be seen in Bevir's argument (2005) about the 
importance of institutionalist ideas for New Labour. He sees these as a distinct form of 
neoliberalism, in the emphasis on networks characterised by social and ethical norms, 
as opposed to a focus purely on marketisation. 
This approach is evident in creative industries policy, both in stressing networks and in 
the underlying assumption that the social norms on which these networks depend 
would be sufficient to create a benign form of economic development. This would 
deliver growth and jobs, as well as respond to the need for social inclusion, 
particularly through employment (DCMS 1999b, 2000a, 2000d, 2007). 
I argue that this rhetoric continued throughout the period under examination, despite 
mounting evidence that such forms of economic development resulted in labour 
markets that were highly unequal in terms of race and class (see Oakley 2006,2009a, 
2009b). In particular, the growing incidence of unpaid work as an entry criteria for the 
II The term neoliberalism is a complex and contested one. Indeed, an argument of this thesis is 
that there are varieties of neoliberalism, including the version represented by New Labour. The 
previous Conservative government had emphasised the importance of markets, the de- 
regulation of finance, the privatisation of public services and state-owned firms, and an attack 
on trade unions. New Labour policy was in some cases the same and in others different but, as 
argued above, the important point of continuity was the notion of the market as a natural way 
of organising society, to which politics can only respond. In defining neoliberalism, I am indebted to Mirowski 2009. 
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creative industries excluded those who lacked parental or other sources of income 
that could make unpaid work viable (Randall and Culkin 2007; DCMS 2008; Cabinet 
Office 2009). 
The originality of this thesis lies in using creative industries to analyse New Labour's 
politics, and doing so from the position of someone who was involved in many 
aspects of creative industries policy throughout the period in question. 
The creative industries are a productive way to view New Labour politics because 
they embody several elements of its understanding of the knowledge economy, 
including work, place and culture. In terms of work, the creative industries are densely 
networked, and employ highly skilled workers in what is often portrayed as desirable, 
even liberatory, forms of work. This is discussed further in Sections 5.3,5.4 and 5.5 (and 
in Oakley et al. 2008; Oakley 2009b, 2009d). 
The attachment of creative industries to specific places, both because of the 
importance of face-to-face interaction in spreading ideas, 12 and the identification of 
some artists and firms with particular milieu (Scott 2000; Pratt 2000,2002,2009), was 
taken to mean that certain locations would retain their importance in a globalised 
economy. Importantly, it was argued that that these activities were less likely to be 
lost to low-wage competition overseas (Department of Trade and Industry 1998). 13 
Ideas about the vibrancy of commercial popular culture were linked, not always 
explicitly, to the notion that the expansion of these sectors would offer enhanced 
opportunities to certain groups: ethnic minorities in particular (Smith 1998; DCMS 
1999b; LDA 2003; BOP Consulting 2008c). These possibilities had also animated cultural 
industries advocates in previous decades (Bianchini 1987; Lewis 1990; O'Connor 2007). 
But in that case, they had been supported by a political understanding that 
achieving this would require state intervention in the structure of markets, both in 
terms of firm ownership and in access to distribution networks. 
Creative industry advocates were keen to expand the market, particularly by 
supporting new businesses, but less keen to re-shape it. What creative industry 
approaches lacked was an account of any potential for conflict or tension between 
12 By which I mean specific 'scenes' that grow up with places such as the Manchester or Detroit 
music scene, or the art scene of East London. 
13 This is discussed further in Oakley 2006 and 2009x. 
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social and economic imperatives, or indeed between market participation and 
democratic participation. Economic development was viewed as being able to 
deliver social goods, including greater social cohesion, so an account of potential 
conflicts was regarded as unnecessary. 14 
The collaborative structures, and indeed traditional social and ethical orientations of 
the creative industries (Banks 2007), meant that they could easily be integrated into a 
notion of benign or progressive economic development (Oakley et al. 2008; Oakley 
2009d). This is particularly the case when one considers the kind of work produced by 
the creative industries and the attitudes of New Labour policymakers towards that 
work. 
As discussed in Sections 5 and 6, below (and in Oakley 2009b), the idea that work 
had changed in ways that resolved the centuries-old conflict of capital and labour 
was central to New Labour's vision of the knowledge economy (Cruddas 2006). 
Creative industry work was emblematic of this. The expansion of these sectors was 
seen to offer 'good work', which provided personal fulfilment and decent 
remuneration, and to offer it to those who had previously been excluded (Smith 1998; 
LDA 2003; Deptford/ Greenwich nd). 
The publication of Creative Britain in 2008 (DCMS 2008) asserted the government's 
concerns about the unrepresentative nature of the cultural and creative workforce, 15 
where women and ethic minorities continued to be under-represented, and 
suggested policies to try and remedy them. But in keeping with creative industry 
approaches, it underestimated the structural factors that produced an 
unrepresentative labour market in these sectors. Policy interventions were to be 
limited to the provision of some paid apprenticeships, and the provision of better 
information for making career choices. The issue of conditions of labour within the 
cultural sectors, and the psychological or economic sustainability of this type of work, 
was not addressed (Ross 2003; Gill and Pratt 2008; Banks and Hesmondhalgh 2009). 
Similarly ignored was the broader context of growing inequality and declining social 
mobility in which the decade of creative industries had taken place (Cabinet Office 
2009; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). It thus stands as an example of New Labour 
14 This is discussed further in Section 6, below, and in Oakley 2006,2009c and 2009d. 15 According to the Sector Skills body, CCSkills, in 2008 around 60 per cent of creative industry 
workers were male, and some 93 per cent were white 
-a particularly alarming fact when one 
considers the concentration of these sectors in London, where almost a quarter of the 
workforce is from an ethnic minority background. See Oakley 2009b for a further discussion of 
the labour market. 
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attitudes to work as a way out of social exclusion (Holden 1999; Driver and Martell 
2002; Barry 2005), and of the limitations of this approach. 
10 
3. My background 
Of the publications submitted for this thesis, one (Oakley et al. 2008) is a 
commissioned piece of research (won via competitive tender and co-authored). The 
others are commissioned conference papers, reports, book chapters and scholarly 
articles. 
This combination reflects my background as a consultant, both in economic 
development and in cultural policy; a policy commentator, particularly associated 
with the Demos thinktank (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999,2001); and latterly as a 
teacher and researcher within higher education. 
Prior to 1997, I had for a number of years been working in an area that was sometimes 
described as 'information society' policy (Oakley 2003) and later as the' knowledge 
economy'. This included periods of time researching management consultancy as a 
knowledge-based industry, while a Research Fellow at Manchester Business School 
(Oakley 1995; Berry and Oakley 1993), and looking at policies on digital information 
from the European Commission, while employed as a Senior Researcher at the Policy 
Studies Institute. This embraced such issues as intellectual property, the 
commercialisation of public sector information (Janssen and Dumortier 2003) and the 
growth of information work and workers (Huws et al. 2001; Garnham 2005). 
In 1997, I became a self-employed consultant/researcher working for a variety of 
public agencies, thinktanks and research organisations. it was at one of these 
thinktanks, Demos, that I co-wrote The Independents (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999), 
which established my reputation as a commentator on what become known as the 
'creative industries'. My purpose in discussing The Independents here is the role that it 
played in my career development and hence in the production of the later work 
submitted for this thesis. 
3.1 The Independents 
Work on The Independents, co-written with Charles Leadbeater, began shortly before 
the publication of the first DCMS Mapping Document (DCMS 1998) 
- 
often thought of 
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as launching the notion of creative industries in the UK, 16 although it should be noted 
that The Independents uses the terms cultural entrepreneurs and cultural industries 
(Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 13), the term 'creative industries' not yet having 
become widespread. 
The Independents covers many of the issues and ideas that would later be taken up 
in creative industries policy, including our perception of the failure of contemporary 
public policy (either through public support for the arts, or small business investment) 
to reach the types of small, cultural businesses that we were describing. 
This observation, which become known as the 'missing middle' (Henry 2007), was 
already the subject of academic and policy work, particularly at Manchester Institute 
for Popular Culture (Redhead 1990; O'Connor 1998; Banks et al. 2000; Raffo et at. 
2000), in McRobbie's work on the fashion industry (McRobbie 1998) and Bilton's on the 
'new adhocracy' (Bilton 1999). Indeed, it could be argued that creative industries 
policy, as it developed over the following decade, consisted primarily of the 
establishment of networks and specialist support agencies designed to address this 
issue. )? 
The publication of The Independents by Demos, strongly associated with the New 
Labour government, and its account of the role and potential of small cultural 
businesses, led to it becoming something of a core text for those uncomfortable with, 
or opposed to, the idea of creative industries (McRobbie 2002). They argued that its 
account of entrepreneurial models of work stressed a more individualistic, indeed 
neoliberal, understanding of cultural production than had been the case in previous 
versions of cultural industries policy, such as that of the Greater London Council 
(Hesmondhalgh 2008). 
The counterbalance to this individualism was presented in The Independents as 
attachment to place. We argued that local cultural businesses thrived on 'easy 
access to local, tacit know-how, a style, a look, a sound' (Leadbeater and Oakley 
16 Although some data from the Mapping Documents is included in The Independents, I was 
not aware that 'mapping' was underway when the research began, and our understanding of 
what constituted a 'cultural entrepreneur', or which firms to interview, had no relation to the 
activities of the Creative Industries Taskforce. The impetus for the publication was linked to 
narratives of urban regeneration, rather than the creative industries per se, hence the inclusion 
of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, and Sheffield Local Education Authority as funders 
of the research. 
17 Examples of such agencies include: the Cultural Industries Development Service (CIDS) in 
Manchester; Creative London; Creative Kernow; Creative Exchange: South Yorkshire; Creative Sheffield; Creative Lewisham; Creative Dorset and many more. 
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1999: 14), which would allow these places to negotiate a new accommodation with 
the global market. 
The degree to which places could do this turned out to be much weaker than we 
suggested. 18 Although The Independents raised questions about the sustainability of 
these businesses (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 15), and the polarised nature of the 
labour market (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999: 17), which is taken up in later 
publications (Oakley 2009a, 2009b, 2009c), it undoubtedly presents an overly positive 
view of the potential of small businesses, both to sustain themselves and grow, and to 
have positive effects in terms of the regeneration of UK towns and cities. 
But it is perhaps in its attitudes to work that The Independents now seems most flawed, 
neglecting what Gill and Pratt (2008) argue is the competitiveness, exhaustion and 
fear of failure that accompanies self-employment. The focus was on the self- 
employed as entrepreneurs (see Oakley 2009b) and many of those interviewed for 
The Independents did indeed relish many of the aspects of self-employment 
- 
an 
issue picked up by many other writers on cultural labour (McRobbie 200419; Banks 
2007). A more critical discussion of cultural labour is one to which several of the 
publications presented here return. 
3.2 Creative industry consultancy 
The development of creative industries policy, as Fleming (2004) has argued, 
engendered a new set of intermediaries and consultants, who became involved in 
advising public agencies, particularly local authorities, and the newly created RDAs 
on creative industries (O'Connor and Gu, forthcoming). 
It is as one of these consultants, having worked on a large number of localised 
creative industry strategies (Sheffield 2002; LDA 2003; NWDA 2004), mapping projects 
(West Sussex 2007), skills strategies (NMP 2004), evaluations of social and economic 
impacts (SHIPS 2008) and feasibility studies (Hartlepool 2003), that I developed some 
of the publications presented here. 
The 'geography' of creative industries consultancy, which in the UK has mostly been 
constituted at the sub-national level, exemplifies in some ways Jessop and others' 
arguments about the re-structuring of the post-war state towards a more multi-scalar 
18 As argued in Oakley 2009b and elsewhere; for example, Gibson and Mocker 2005. 19 Accessed October 2008. 
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governance regime (Jessop 2002,2005; Peck 2002,2004). This is particularly important 
in the debates about 'creative cites' (see Oakley 2009a), which many have argued 
are the prime site of creative industry development (Scott 2000; Florida 2002). It also 
helps to explain the relative unimportance that 'national' policy attributed to the 
creative industries, and hence the relatively few DCMS publications that will feature in 
any account. But the story of the UK in this period is also one of New Labour's failures 
to secure democratic legitimacy for its plans for sub-national government, and its 
creation of a plethora of public agencies, often with over-lapping territories. Plans for 
elected regional assemblies in England were abandoned after the government lost a 
referendum in the North East of England in 2004; the sub-national agencies 
responsible for much creative industry work, such as RDAs, have been vulnerable to 
the charge of being unelected quangos ever since. 
The fragmented geography of public funding meant that commissioners of creative 
industries consultancy could range from the very localised 
-a strategy for a particular 
'neighbourhood' (Manchester's Oxford Road, for example; BOP Consulting 2008b) 
- 
to those taking a regional and, only occasionally, national approach. The relationship 
between this shifting geography and the 'epistemic community' (Haas 1992) of 
policymakers and consultants is of course co-constitutive. Prince (2009) has observed 
that as the policy concept of creative industries began to circulate, more individuals 
become creative industries experts, and more clients, needing creative industry 
advice, were, for a while at least, created. 
This community and its international networks (Prince 2009) has its own infrastructure 
of conferences, 20 journals and meetings, but it also overlapped with academic and 
policy networks, particularly for a time at least, in forums like FOCI. 21 
The typical consultancy engagement, if there is such as thing, is generally a brief 
affair, usually between two and four months in duration. In this it reflects the often 
short-term nature of funding and adds to the difficulty in developing longitudinal 
research (discussed in Oakley 2004a and Section 8, below). The literature produced 
by such engagements is discussed in Section 4, below. 
20 For example, Creative Clusters, a conference series that began in 2002 and ran more or less 
annually until 2007. Its focus was on place-based creative industry economic developments 
and as such generally drew a large crowd of local authority staff, along with consultants and 
some academics (see creatveclusters. com). 
21 FOCI 
- 
Forum on Creative Industries 
- 
was a membership organisation based primarily at 
Manchester Metropolitan University, which brought together academics, consultants, 
policymakers and some industry representatives to discuss the issues of creative industries and 
regional development. 
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3.3 The nature of policy and academic writing 
The publications presented here arise out of my work both as a consultant and as an 
academic. As is characteristic of this type of work, they combine a variety of 
methods: statistical analysis, surveys, interviews (telephone, face-to-face and focus 
groups), reviews of policy and, in some cases, both academic and grey literature. 
In this they are produced using the same mix that characterises a consultancy 
engagement, but with a much heavier emphasis on the academic literature, 
especially in later publications (Oakley 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). 
It is not that academic literature never features in consultancy work: cultural agencies 
(for example, Arts Council England or the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council) 
and RDAs (see Oakley 2004b, for example) commission narrative literature reviews 
that include academic work. Some of this focuses on research into the 'social 
impacts' of particular cultural investments (e. g., Dodd et al. 2002; Geddes 2004; BOP 
Consulting 2005a), but it is less common, in my experience, for local authorities 
pursuing 'creative industry' strategies to draw on academic literature as a starting 
point. 22 
Mapping the creative industries (estimates of the number and type of creative 
businesses in a specific locale) was a task often carried out for consultancy clients 
such as local authorities 23 This resulted both in a stronger emphasis on statistical work 
in consultancy, as opposed to academic work, but also in concerns about the rigour 
of such work being expressed in some academic publications (Volkerling 2001; 
Garnham 2005; Chapain and Comunian 2009). 
Attempts to standardise the measurement of creative industries, such as the Data 
Evidence Toolkit (DCMS 2004), as well as the DCMS's own Economic Estimates, 24 were 
intended in part to address these concerns. My point here is not to enter the debate 
about the reliability or otherwise of creative industry statistics, but simply to say that 
consultancy work often starts from a statistical viewpoint. This could be characterised 
as an argument that the creative industries are growing fast, and therefore we need 
22 This may simply be to do with relative levels of specialist expertise (by which I mean specialist 
research staff) within local authorities, as opposed to national cultural agencies. 23 See Prince 2009, for a fuller discussion of the importance of mapping in producing creative industries discourse and for a discussion of the Data Evidence Toolkit. 24 There were eight annual DCMS Economic Estimates, the latest of which is from February 2010. 
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to support them 
-a claim which is often made, to make the case for public 
investment. This starting point accounts for some of the accusations of boosterism that 
have been levelled at creative industry consultancy, including my own (Knell and 
Oakley 2007). And it may account for the almost apologetic tone displayed in later 
statistical work, which often revises the numbers downwards (Greater London 
Authority 2010). 
Concerning the selection of methods, therefore, the difference between academic 
and consultancy research has never seemed to me to be that great. The questions 
asked are often different, emphasis is different, tone of voice is different, as, of course, 
are sources of legitimacy 
- 
peer reviews versus client satisfaction 
- 
but these 
differences are not primarily methodological. 
Bell (2007: 54) has written compellingly of the experience of work 'at the interface 
between academic and applied research', and what he describes as the 
'mundanizing' process that occurs when academic theories are translated into 
material suitable for a policy audience. Although recognising this description, my own 
experience was somewhat different, and some of the publications presented here 
(Oakley 2004a, 2006) represent an attempt to reflect on the involvement in policy, in 
an academic context, rather than the other way around. One might also call this a 
'de-mundanizing' process (if one were not concerned about violence to the English 
language), that is, the ability to reflect on these processes in a medium that can 
allow for greater complexity. It is a process that has in many ways been replicated in 
the writing of this commentary. 
This touches on long-running debates within cultural studies and in geography, 25 
about the role of the academic in the formation and critique of public policy. The 
degree to which academics should engage directly in public policy formation, as 
Tony Bennett has argued that they should (Bennett 1992), is disputed by others. 
McGuigan (2003) articulates the need to maintain critical distance from policymakers, 
a tension that Bell (2007) suggests plagued his own attempts to provide policy advice 
from the standpoint of an academic. 
A version of this debate has recently surfaced in creative industries, with Schlesinger 
(2009b) arguing that much of the academic community researching or teaching in 
25 See, for example, Bennett, 1992; Martin, 2001; Massey, 2001; McGuigan, 2003; Bell, 2007. See 
also Cunningham, 2003, The evolving creative industries: From original assumptions to 
contemporary interpretations, unpublished paper, http: //eprints. qut. edu. au/archive/00004391, 
retrieved 22 August 2007. 
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the area has been part of what he terms the 'Hallelujah Chorus' of approval for these 
notions, rather than critical commentators. 
My own academic work has been informed by the experience of working with public 
policymakers, not least in understanding the very real constraints under which they 
operate, and the attempts often made to circumvent them. This allows one to avoid 
naive assumptions about policy development. As Olma has noted (2007), the 
practice of critiquing policy reports alone, often by recasting particular phrases 
- 
'creative industries' and the like 
- 
in scare quotes, does not get us very far in 
understanding the complexity of creative industries. In my experience, and perhaps, 
ironically, the consultant is often better placed to engage in critical debates with 
policymakers, in part because this is less expected of them, and in part because they 
are seen to have a 'closer' understanding of the subject. 
Having looked at my own background in the field, the next section of the 
commentary briefly considers the range of literatures concerned with the creative 
industries. 
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-4 Producing the creative industries: the relevant literatures 
Having discussed my own experiential background in this area, I now turn to the 
literatures on which a study of this topic must draw. These include a range of policy 
documents produced by DCMS and other central and local government bodies; a 
series of consultancy reports and strategies; and academic literature. My purpose in 
this section is to discuss the type of literature that informs creative industries policy 
rather than provide an exhaustive review of it. 26 What I regard as the key texts in terms 
of providing theoretical background to the creative industries are discussed in 
Sections 5 and 6 below, in connection with my overall thesis. 
4.1 Policy Statements 
One way of studying policy may be to follow an idea from conception, citing specific 
political ideas or manifesto commitments, often via primary legislation. This is not 
possible in this case. No primary legislation was required to bring the creative 
industries into being, and between initiation of the Creative Industries Taskforce in 
199727 and Creative Britain in 2008 (DCMS) few national policy documents were 
produced. 
At a national level, those that were produced came largely from the Creative 
Industries Task Force (CITF) set up in 1997.28 Its remit was to recommend steps to 
maximise the economic impact of the UK creative industries at home and abroad 
(DCMS 1998). Following production of the Mapping Documents (DCMS 1998,2001 a), 
CITF began a programme of work on what appeared to be the primary issues of 
26 See Prince 2009, for a useful discussion of creative industries policy literature; and Oakley 
2009b, for a longer discussion of relevant academic literature. 
27 The Creative Industries Task Force was established under the Chairmanship of the Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport Chris Smith. Members included fashion designer Paul 
Smith, Eric Salama (WPP), Gail Rebuck (Random Houser), David Puttnam, Janice Hughes 
(Spectrum), Robert Deveruex/Richard Branson (Virgin), Waheed Ali, Alan McGee. In 1999 
Charles Allen (Granada) and Stephen Hepell (Ultralab) were appointed. It also featured 
representatives of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions; the FCO; DTI; 
HM Treasury; the Department for Education and Employment; the Minister for Women; The 
Scottish, Welsh and NI Office; the British Council; the Office of Science and Technology; No. 10 
Policy Unit; and DCMS officials. It was wound up in 2000, having 'completed its main 
programme of work' (DCMS 2002: 4). 
28 The Creative Industries Taskforce, of course, built on earlier statistical work in both the arts and the cultural industries, notably Goreham & Partners (1996) and Casey et al. (1996). Conceptually, it was also influenced by the Keating Government's 'Creative Nation', 
produced in Australia 1994 (Government of Australia 1994). 
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creative industries support: skills (DCMS 2000d), finance (DCMS 2000c), export 
promotion (DCMS 1999a, 1999c) and intellectual property (DCMS 2000b). A sub- 
group led by MP Richard Caborn considered the issue of the creative industries at a 
regional level (DCMS 2000a). 
These documents both continued to develop the notion of creative industries as a 
governable object29 (Mitchell 2002) and produced specific policies for aspects of 
them. However, such policies tend to be constructed not by DCMS, but by specific 
national forums such as the Creative Industries Export Promotion Advisory Group, or at 
the regional and local level. 
As discussed in Oakley (2006,2009a), it was at this regional and local level that the 
fusion of economic development, regeneration and social inclusion goals was largely 
enacted (see, for example, London Development Agency 2003). National issues such 
as intellectual property or exports were less prominent at regional level, whereas job 
creation, social inclusion, talent retention and area-based improvements were more 
so. While primary policy documents reflect some of this sub-national policymaking 
(e. g., NWDA 20080, much relevant material is contained within the grey literature. 
4.2 Grey literature 
The majority of grey literature is commissioned by public sector agencies, and in the 
case of creative industries, often produced by 'actors formally external to the state' 
(Prince 2009: 93), such as consultants. Although a reading of the grey literature in this 
area is unlikely to provide much in the way of theoretical background, it does give a 
clue to the policy techniques that are used, and the policy actors involved. 
Mapping the sector in terms of revenues, exports, employment and contribution to 
GDP was one of the first activities undertaken under the newly initiated creative 
industries banner, and it has continued to be a popular technique at regional and 
local levels (e. g., BOP Consulting 2005b, 2007,2008a: Fleming 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). 
Other common local policy approaches include the construction of specialist 
business units or 'creative quarters' (e. g., Fleming 2005a; NMP 2003); advice on types 
29 For example, by the development of a Public Service Agreement Target (PSA 4), the aim of 
which was to improve the productivity of the creative, tourism and leisure industries. See DCMS 2009, which, among other things, discusses the difficulties of estimating such a figure for the 
creative industries. 
30 See also Creative Sheffield, Business Plan, 2006-7, http: //www. creativesheffield. co. uk, 
retrieved 31 August 2007; Martin Jackson, 2006, In search of Chunky Dunsters 
... 
a cultural 
strategy for the South West, Culture South West: COI. 
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of business support31 advice on funding, particularly public investment; educational 
initiatives (BOP Consulting/SQW 2005); and skills development and training. 
For the most part, this literature concerns itself with the pragmatics of particular 
interventions. It rarely seeks to analyse or critique the notion of creative industries, but, 
as suggested in section 3.3 above, there are sufficient exceptions to suggest that 
consultants have not just been compliant actors in the development of creative 
industries. Prince (2009) argues that the epistemic community of consultants, policy 
advisors and academics that grew up around creative industries in the UK have 
served to subtly re-shape the understanding of it. He cites the development of the 
DCMS Evidence Toolkit (DCMS 2004) by academic Andy Pratt, together with BOP 
Consulting and Experian business strategies, as a way in which subsidised cultural 
activities, including the heritage sector, were re-inserted into regional creative 
industries policy. And as I argued in Oakley (2009a), while the work of Richard Florida 
was highly influential for a time among UK local authorities, influential critiques 
developed early, not just from thinktanks (Nathan 2005) but also from consultancies 
(BOP Consulting 2005a; SHIPS 2008). 
Indeed, the notion of 'evidence-based policymaking' (Oakley 2008), and the fact 
that many consultancy strategies did contain research on the shape and size of the 
creative industry sectors, meant that, as van Heur (2008) comments, the discourse of 
the creative industries could sometimes be turned against itself. In particular, 
statistical data such as the DCMS Economic Estimates or the GLA's work on London 
(e. g., Greater London Authority 2007) began to undermine claims for growth in the 
creative industries in the period after 2005. 
4.3 The role of thinktanks 
The role of thinktanks in the public debate on creative industries policy has recently 
been analysed by Schlesinger (2009b). His paper concentrates on the Institute for 
Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Demos, both of which he regards as key New 
Labour thinktanks. He is concerned with the inter-penetration by a small group of 
people of the worlds of government, thinktanks and the media, and hence by the 
influence they wield. 
31 Such as 'Own It', an intellectual property advice service for small businesses, based at the University of the Arts London 
- 
see Fleming 2008. 
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While the IPPR in particular was hugely influential on New Labour's broadcasting and 
communications policy, particularly via individuals such as James Purne1132 and Ed 
Richards. 33 The Independents aside, neither Demos nor the IPPR had much of a role in 
the formation of the notion of creative industries. More influential at that stage was 
the lower-profile Smith Institute, which co-funded The Independents and organised a 
series of Downing Street seminars on the themes of entrepreneurship and the 
knowledge economy in 1998.34 
John Holden's work on 'cultural value' (Holden 2004,2006) has influenced the debate 
about instrumentalism in cultural policy, a theme enthusiastically adopted by right- 
wing thinktanks such as Policy Exchange (Mirza 2006). But it would be fair to say that 
in creative industries specifically 
- 
the Smith Institute's early intervention aside 
- 
thinktanks had little involvement until the Creative Economy Programme was 
launched in 2005 by the then Secretary of State, James Purnell. 
The Creative Economy Programme, which resulted in Creative Britain (DCMS 2008), 
was a somewhat tortuous affair. Seven working groups considered a range of 
evidence on issues ranging from intellectual property to diversity. 35 The purpose was 
to re-examine the notion of creative industries, and to produce a formulation that 
was both more intellectually robust36 and more integrated with economic activities 
outside the creative industries themselves, hence, 'creative economy'. 37 
Various changes of ministerial personnel, and turf wars between departments, meant 
that the Creative Economy Review became bogged down and protracted. To 
32 Purnell, then Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport, had played a role in the IPPR's 
work on media convergence, which led to the formation of Ofcom. At the time of writing, he is 
working with Demos on its Open Left Project, 'a return to the big questions of the Left', see 
http: //www demos co uk/projects/ol2en-left, retrieved 07 December 2009. 
33 Ed Richards, Chief Executive of Ofcom, had formerly advised Tony Blair on media and 
communication issues. 
34 The Smith Institute, set up in memory of former Labour leader John Smith, was always seen as 
a representative of the 'Brownite' wing of New Labour. Former BFI Director Wilf Stevenson was 
Director for many years until forced to resign following criticism from the Charity Commission 
that its closeness to Gordon Brown breached the rules governing charitable organisations. 
Graham Hitchen, former Policy Director at the Arts Council, and a key figure in Creative 
Industries in the UK, is a Fellow of the Institute, as was Ed Balls. 
35 The full range of working groups was: Infrastructure, Competition and IP, Access to Finance 
and Business support, Education and Skills, Diversity, Technology and Evidence, and Analysis. 
36 That is, more robust in the sense of providing a better 'model' of the creative industries than 
simply a list of 13 sub-sectors. Attempts to remodel the understanding of the creative industries 
had already included the DCMS Data Evidence Toolkit (DCMS 2004), which defined the 
creative industries within the context of a wider cultural sector, Frontier Economics (2006) and 
the NESTA report (2006), all of which looked at different ways of categorising the cultural and 
creative sector. 
37 A senior DCMS Civil Servant told me that the hope was also to cull some of the 'creative 
anywhere' networks and support agencies that had sprung up throughout the country. 
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refresh the thinking and try to build a 'narrative' that various government 
departments could agree on, the Work Foundation, a thinktank which had hitherto 
had very little to say on creative industries, 38 was drafted in. 39 The Work Foundation 
was headed by Will Hutton, a sometime critic of New Labour (see Section 5, below) 
and a 'heavyweight' in policy terms. But, as Schlesinger acknowledges (2009b), the 
Work Foundation document, Staying Ahead (Andari et al. 2007), was not, as had 
been widely predicted, a precursor to a government Green Paper. 
The limits of thinktank influence on the policy formation process can be seen here. 
Disagreements between the DCMS and DTI/ BERR about who 'owned' software, 
videogames and 'the high tech' parts of the creative industries, as well as continuing 
suspicion at the Treasury about whether creative industries was really a part of the 
economy that warranted special attention, had always dogged the creative 
industries debate (Schlesinger 2009b). An external contractor such as the Work 
Foundation was no more likely to weave these disagreements into a coherent policy 
line than anyone else could. Having said that, this was not a case of civil servants or 
government departments 'taking back' the issue from thinktanks and advisors. The 
DCMS report, Creative Britain (2008), was drafted in large part by John Newbigin, 
former adviser to Chris Smith and influential in the first DCMS incarnation of the 
creative industries, via the Creative Industries Task Force. 
4.4 The treatment of this subject in the academic literature 
Most of the publications submitted here contain reviews of relevant academic 
literature: on economic geography (Oakley 2009a), cultural labour markets (Oakley 
2009b) and the discourse of creativity and innovation (Oakley 2009c). The purpose of 
this section is to consider the existing literature on a narrower topic: the growth of an 
academic critique of creative industries. 
While the term 'creative industries' and the shift of policy signified by the Creative 
Industries Mapping Documents (DCMS 1998,2001 a) both feature in the academic 
literature from around 2001 (see, for example, Volkerling 2001; Cunningham 2002), the 
volume of literature increases significantly from around 2004, when creative industries 
start to become the subject of critique (Miller 2004; Oakley 2004a; Pratt 2004; 
Garnharn 2005; Hesmondhalgh 2005). 
38 Although it had done much work on the 'knowledge economy'; see 
http: //www. theworkfoundation. com/research/keconomy. aspx. 
39 As discussed in 3.2, above, the creative industries expertise gained by Work Foundation staff 
on Staying Ahead enabled it to bid for subsequent creative industry research contracts and 
become another actor in this space. 
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A special issue of the International Journal of Cultural Studies, 'The New Economy, 
Creativity and Consumption' (Hartley 2004), contained several pieces which dealt 
with the notion of creative industries (Miller 2004; Oakley 2004a; Pratt 2004). Wang's 
paper, 'How For can the Discourse of Creative Industries Travel? ', in the same issue, 
queries the transplanting of creative industries to differing political and economic 
contexts, though the question in the title was soon answered by a host of work 
relating the degree to which creative industries had been internationalised. 4° 
Hartley's edited collection, Creative Industries (2005), features a number of chapters 
on related discourses such as the creative city, the 'new economy', and creativity 
within the firm, but has less to say about the policy notion of creative industries per se. 
The introduction identifies creativity as a 'driver of social and economic change' 
(Hartley 2005: 1), a change which, in a foretaste of things to come, re-imagines the 
arts and creative industries in the context of the knowledge economy, new media 
and 'newly interactive citizen-consumers' (2005: 5). This belief in what was seen as the 
liberatory potential of creativity, combined with digital technology, continues in work 
produced by scholars in the Creative Industries Faculty at Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT), a theme which was to see them become the foremost example of 
the creativity-as-innovation school of thought (Oakley 2009c; O'Connor 2009). 
In doing so, QUT scholars are seen to have abandoned the cultural industries tradition 
of critique in favour of a neoliberal political reading of economic change (Miller 2009). 
Cunningham argues that this charge exemplifies the gap between the reception of 
creative industries by policymakers and business, on one hand, which he sees as 
largely positive, and academics on the other. This, he argues, acts as a 'textbook 
case of the disabling gap between policy and critique' (2009a: 375). 
There is little doubt that much academic work on the creative industries takes an 
explicitly critical approach (e. g., McRobbie 2002; Lovink and Rossiter 2007; 
Hesmondhalgh 2008; Miller 2009; Schlesinger 2009b). A special issue of the 
International Journal of Cultural Policy (Banks and O'Connor 2009), entitled 'After the 
Creative Industries', took an almost valedictory tone, helped in no small way by 
40 See, for example, UNCTAD 2004 (accessed December 3,2009); Gibson and Mocker 2004, 
2005; O'Connor 2004; Hui 2006; O'Connor and Gu 2006; Mayerhoffer and Mokre 2007; Kaino 
2007; Prince 2009; van Heur 2008. 
23 
recent statistical indicators that the UK's creative industries were for from healthy. 41 
Banks and O'Connor argue that just over 10 years after it was born the idea of 
creative industries is in danger of collapse, as the distinction between it and any other 
part of the economy comes under threat of policies which 'seek to finesse the 
possibility of differences between the representational or redemptive functions of 
cultural production and its commercial imperative' (2009: 369). 
This, they argue, signals the end of any benign convergence between the creative 
industries and a progressive re-structuring of the economy. The assumptions 
underlying this presumed convergence are the subject of this thesis and particularly 
of the next two sections. 
41 See Oakley 2009c, but also a speech by Jonathan Kestenbaum of NESTA, suggesting that 
'Just a handful of creative businesses were responsible for the expansion of Creative Britain between 2005 and 2008. Without them, we would be telling a story of economic loss not gain'; 
see http: //www. nesta. org. uk/news_events/assets/features/ high- 
impoct_firms_are_key_to_unlocking_growth_in_creative_industries, 
retrieved 4 December 2009. 
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5. New Labour, the knowledge economy and the re-shaping 
of work 
Having considered the literature, the next two sections seek to place the idea of 
creative industries within the politics of New Labour. 
5.1 Is there a New Labour Ideology? 
Much of the literature on New Labour politics concerns itself with the degree to which 
it represents a consistent or coherent ideology, and how much its politics represent a 
break with 'old' Labour, or traditional social democratic politics (Freeden 1999a, 
1999b; Hay 1999; Thompson 2002; Finlayson 2003; Leggett 2005). 
Stuart Hall's famous description of Labour's 'double shuffle' (Hall 2003) describes it as 
a 'hybrid regime' composed of neoliberal and social democratic strands, in which 
Hall feared neoliberalism had become dominant. Clarke (2004,2005) also draws 
attention to New Labour's neoliberal and communitarian strands, manifested in what 
he sees as its confused notion of the 'citizen-consumer' 42 Benn (2000: 309) discusses 
another perceived aspect of New Labour 'dualism', namely the co-existence of 
social liberalism with strands of populist illiberalism. 
Other writers are more persuaded that there is a coherent New Labour ideology, 
although they often disagree as to its nature. A popular argument is that it is simply a 
continuation of Thatcherism (Power and Whitty 1999; Jenkins 2006), or what 
Fairclough calls 'Thatcherism with a few frills' (2000: viii). Buckler and Dolowitz (2000) 
refer to it as social liberalism, combining liberal individualism with redistributive social 
justice. They describe this redistributive element using New Labour's favoured term of 
'fairness', a notion that they argue is interpreted as purely procedural and designed 
to ensure equality of opportunity, not of outcome. Driver and Martell (1997), on the 
other hand, regard New Labour's politics as a sort of liberal conservatism, which 
celebrates the market economy and yet prescribes an essentially conservative 
communitarianism43 as the cure for excessive individualism. 
42 A blurring of what Clarke argues are distinct social and political notions, with 'citizen' referring to a more public, political notion and 'consumer' an essentially private, economic one. The hybrid term suggests the neoliberal subsuming of the political into the economic. 
43 This, they argue, drew heavily on the work of Amitai Etzioni (1993). 
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For Freeden (1999b), the absence of an ideological 'grand narrative' is not a failing 
specific to New Labour, but characteristic of modern political parties. He argues that 
it is not the moving between liberal and social democratic strands of thought that 
makes New Labour distinctive, but its particular readings of these traditions, especially 
concerning the relationship of the individual to community. 
The notion of New Labour politics as a response to a perceived set of social changes 
is developed in Alan Finlayson's work (Finlayson 2003) and is one I have adopted for 
this thesis. What he describes as the 'fluidity' of the New Labour 'project'44 is 
attributed to its concern with the changing nature of society. To understand it, he 
argues, we have to understand how New Labour 'makes sense of social changes' 
(2003: 6). Among these changes are what he identifies as the collapse of class-based 
politics, the growth of individualism and, crucially, fundamental changes in the UK 
economy. These all informed New Labour's conception of the knowledge economy 
which, I argue, becomes a deterministic account of both social and economic 
change, and underlies its creative industry policies. 
Bevir's account (2005) of New Labour acknowledges the influence of institutionalism, 
which stressed the social embeddedness of people and institutions, in contrast to the 
market-led autonomy favoured by the Conservatives. As this thesis demonstrates, 
these ideas can be seen clearly in creative industries policy; but as Bevir argues, New 
Labour nevertheless 'tacitly accepts the neoliberal idea of a universal, unavoidable 
and tyrannical economic rationality' (2005: 85). 
And this acceptance undermined any attempt to use embedded social networks to 
deliver a progressive form of economic development. 
5.2 Responding to circumstance 
- 
New Times? 
When it came to power in 1997, the Labour Party had been in opposition for 18 years, 
and had used that time to radically re-evaluate British society and its responses to the 
changes therein. What was understood as the collapse of Keynesian social 
democracy in the sterling crisis of 1976 (Thompson 2002), was followed by the rise of 
44 The notion of the New Labour 'project' is generally dated from Blair's accession to the 
leadership in 1994 and refers to a process of 'modernising' the Labour party's ideology, 
organisation and policies 
- 
most significantly perhaps the abandonment of the Clause IV 
aspiration to public ownership of the means of production. 
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Thatcherism, a decline in manufacturing (with consequent mass unemployment), 
growth in the service sector and, hence, a fracturing of Labour's traditional working- 
class voting bloc (Hobsbawm 1981). With trade unionism in decline, partly through 
unemployment and partly through anti-union legislation (Deakin 1992), Labour felt 
that it needed to respond to the growth of what some saw as the 'privileged core' of 
the labour market: those in highly skilled and well-paid jobs, who were attracted to 
Thatcherism (Elliott 1993). The danger of not doing so was feared to be political 
marginalisation (Jessop et al. 1984). 
For Stuart Hall, in the late 1980s, the Left seemed 'not just displaced by Thatcherism, 
but disabled, flattened, becalmed by the very prospect of change; afraid of rooting 
itself in the new and unable to make the leap of imagination required to engage the 
future' (1988: 28). 
This future orientation, which was to become so key to the creation of 'New Labour', 
meant grappling with, as well as changes to, the labour market, the dissolution of 
traditional class/ status formations (Beck 1992; Bauman 2000), and the growth of a 
consumerism differentiated by taste and 'lifestyle' rather than social class (Murray 
1988; Hall 1988). 
For Hall and others gathered under the banner of the magazine Marxism Today (MT), 
such changes could offer an opportunity for the Left, if it were willing to recapture the 
notion of individual autonomy from the Right (Hay 1999; Thompson 2002). As Finlayson 
has argued (2003), in the latter half of the 1980s, MT exercised an influence out of all 
proportion to its circulation: even more so in retrospect, given that many of those who 
wrote for it 
- 
including Geoff Mulgan and Charles Leadbeater 
- 
would go on to 
influence New Labour thinking45 when in government. 
MT's central thesis was that the changes outlined above, and in particular the shift 
from 'Fordist' mass production to 'Post-Fordism'46 (Amin 1994), were paralleled by a 
change outside the labour market, away from 'massification' of public services, 
towards what Leadbeater called 'socialist individualism' (1988: 14). This was not a 
'rolling back of the state' for traditional Conservative small-state reasons, but an 
45 Geoff Mulgan, founder of the thinktank Demos, worked at Number 10, Downing Street as head of both the Policy Unit and the Strategy Unit from 1997-2004; Leadbeater was regularly 
employed as a government advisor, notably on the Department of Trade and Industry, White Paper, Building the Knowledge Driven Economy (1998). 
46 This is particularly in relation to a reading of Post-Fordism that associates it with small batch, 
more specialised production and more individualistic patterns of consumption. 
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argument that a new form of empowered individualism could allow the state to 
'wither away'. This notion of individualism was differentiated from that of the Thatcher 
government by emphasising the importance of the embedded social norms that 
govern relationships and, hence, the responsibility that people should take for one 
another (Bevir 2005). 
Hall (1988), as might be expected from a cultural theorist, emphasised the cultural 
nature of these changes, not just in an anthropological sense, but through the 
aestheticisation of production, the importance of design and styling, of image and 
brand 
- 
'the games of using things to signify' who we are, as he put it (Hall 1988: 28). 
Robin Murray, another Marxism Today contributor, chided the old Left for its 'puritan' 
refusal to celebrate the 'variety and creativity in consumption' that the British High 
Street now offered (Murray 1988: 10). 
But it was in response to the changing nature of work, and the rise of what came to 
be termed the 'knowledge economy' (Department of Trade and Industry 1998), that 
New Labour's ideology became more clearly defined. 
Labour MP, Jon Cruddas, writing in the later days of the New Labour regime, 
remarked on the appeal of the knowledge economy idea, 
In a stunning and quite brilliant political move, these ideas legitimised the 
repositioning of New Labour. At a stroke, the old negatives were dealt with, as 
they belonged to a previous epoch of industrial work organisation, and to a 
Labour Party that belonged in that era. As such, New Labour is free from a 
working class that is literally withering away. Class, inequality and issues of 
power can be overcome by individual self-actualisation once we overcome 
the only inequality that matters 
- 
access to human capital (2006: 208). 
The next section explores what it was about the knowledge economy that proved so 
alluring to New Labour. 
5.3 New labour and the knowledge economy 
This section addresses the question of why the idea of a knowledge economy 
became so central to a whole range of New Labour policies; it was not limited to 
economic policies but ranged across education, training and social policy (e. g., 
Department of Social Security 1998; Department for Education and Employment 
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2000a; Lambert 2003; Leitch 2006), including the development of the creative 
industries'. 
The idea that the requirements of the new 'globalised' economy and the experience 
of the workplace had fundamentally changed (for many, if not all, workers) was key 
to New Labour's approach. 'Flexible specialisation', that is, firm strategies based on 
multi-use equipment, highly skilled workers and strategies of competition through 
innovation (different goods, not just cheaper goods), appeared to some leftist 
thinkers as a re-valorisation of work and workers, not a diminishing of them. Thus 
Murray argued, 'Post-Fordism sees labour as the key asset of modern production' 
(1988: 49). And this labour was to be increasingly highly skilled, as only highly skilled, 
knowledge-intensive labour would allow a country such as the UK to avoid a low- 
wage solution to its economic ills. Routine production, both in manufacturing and 
services, was, it was feared, to be exported to developing economies (Holden 1999). 
Others argued that the post-Fordist workplace was inherently less hierarchical (Sabel 
1982), a claim we can see echoed in later writers on the 'creative economy', such as 
Florida (2002; see also Oakley 2009a). These more 'humane' workplaces47 were said 
to liberate the expertise of highly skilled workers, allowing both productivity gains and 
the development of a more contented workforce (Handy 1995). 
Another element of flexible specialisation that influenced New Labour policy 
(particularly in the area of creative industries) was the role of small, interdependent 
firms, often geographically clustered, as in the so-called 'Third Italy' region of Northern 
Italy (Thompson 2002; O'Connor 2007). +8 As digital technology became cheaper, firm 
size was seen as less of an impediment to economic success. In some cases these 
changes were associated with the democratisation of decision making in the 
workplace (Handy 1995), and with different forms of ownership, such as producer co- 
operatives and labour-managed firms (Hirst 1994). 
Thompson (2002: 106) refers to these ideas as 'post-Fordist socialism' and argues that it 
offered the Left 'a new and optimistic meta-history' to replace both the perceived 
failure of state socialist enterprises and the dominance of big business. This tapped 
47 See Ross 2003, for a critique of this notion. 
48 The term 'Third Italy' was used to distinguish the clusters of small firms in the North East of the 
country from either the poor South of Italy or the traditionally wealthy North West. Unlike the larger employers of the North West, these smaller firms, often in manufacturing, were seen to 
withstand the economic crises of the 1970s and early 1980s. This finding was attributed to their dense clustering and high rates of innovation. In particular, the specialised business support 
offered by 'real service' centres was influential on models of creative industries business support. 
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into potent traditions of socialist thought, deriving from such writers as William Morris, 
about the importance of well-rounded, independent artisans with control over their 
working lives (Morris 2004). In the contemporary context, it was seen as being 
particularly enabled by the falling costs of digital technology (Garnham 2005), and 
stimulated by discriminating consumers looking for innovative ways to express 
themselves through consumption (Murray 1988; Hartley 2005). 
As Thompson acknowledges, for a time at least, this notion of post-Fordism was allied 
to a debate about ownership and participation at work, partly linked to a long-term 
interest on the Left in co-operatives and worker-managed businesses. Debates about 
ownership were briefly given a new lease of life by the ideas of 'radical 
stakeholderism', which become popular in the early 1990s (Kay 1993, Hutton 1996). 49 
Stakeholderism, as described in Will Hutton's best-seller, The State We're In (1996), 
draws strongly on social democratic notions of a reformed capitalism. It presents a 
critique of Anglo-American capitalism as too short-termist in its approach, dependent 
on finance rather than manufacturing, and managed in the interests of quick returns 
to shareholders, rather than the long-term interest of the economy. In terms of firm 
ownership, the notion of stakeholder was used by writers such as Hutton to imply that 
groups other than shareholders 
- 
employees, suppliers, sub-contractors and 
consumers 
- 
also had a legitimate interest in the behaviours and outcomes of the firm, 
an interest that needed to be supported by legislation that ensured wider decision 
making. This model of capitalism was often associated with continental European 
practices or the so-called Rhine model (Albert 1993). 50 
For some New Labour thinkers, however, European economies were seen as sclerotic 
and unable to generate the jobs of the future, compared to places like Silicon Valley 
in California (Leadbeater 1997). California was touted as the model that the UK 
should follow, both because it 'has captured a leading position in the most 
knowledge-intensive sectors of the fastest growing industries in the world' 
(Leadbeater 1997: 2), and because the size and structure of its economy, which was 
relatively decentralised and service sector-intensive, was seen as more similar to 
Britain than that of Germany. 
49 This concept, in slightly different form, seems to have become popular again, at least with thinktanks. See Will Davies's Re-inventing the Firm, published by Demos in 2009, and Philip Blond's The Ownership State, published by NESTA in 2009. 
so Elsewhere, Albert defines his Rhine model as being based on a 'community of interests' within the firm between workers and owners, and between consumers and producers in the wider 
economy (Albert 1993: 88). 
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The reputation of the US West Coast as the home of fast-growing media and 
information technology firms was, at the time, unchallenged. New Labour thinkers 
were inclined to see this innovative culture as more than simply an economic success; 
it was also viewed as a source of social and cultural models for society (Leadbeater 
1997; Flores and Gray 2000). Bevir (2005) felt that this again reflected the influence of 
institutionalist ideas within New Labour. The flexibility, responsiveness and innovation 
that neoliberals ascribe solely to markets could only arise, New Labour theorists 
argued, within a highly networked economy, where relationships of trust allowed 
ideas to circulate. 
What Grey calls the 'fetish of change' (2003) allied enthusiasm about the 
employment-creating potential of the Silicon Valley model to a political model that 
saw the growing use of digital technology as allowing people to increasingly self- 
govern (Mulgan 1994). In adopting it, New Labour sought to de-politicise its own 
actions, presenting changes in the economy as fait accompli to which it could only 
react, and which could then be used to justify social and other policies. 
5.4 Symbolic analysts and precarious workers 
The notion of a knowledge economy clearly had a lot to offer New Labour, both in its 
link to a tradition of autonomous labour and in the potential it offered for a Labour 
Party in opposition to develop an answer to Thatcherism (Thompson 2002). 
But problems soon became apparent. Far from producing a series of 'Kelmscotts', 51 
even advocates of the 'knowledge economy' (Reich 1993) worried that it had a 
tendency to produce a dual labour force, with a high-skilled and well-paid core and 
a more casualised, low-paid periphery. Even the 'Third Italy' was said to pit 'male 
machinists, technicians and designers' against more casual workers in smaller firms 
(Thompson 2002: 117) 
-a tendency exacerbated by the relative lack of unionisation in 
the smaller firms to which work was often sub-contracted (Brusco 1982). The scattering 
of workers among small firms, even if geographically clustered, made collective 
bargaining over pay and conditions unlikely (Thompson 2002). 
Moreover, this discourse often appeared to have little to say about the larger 
international context in which such developments were taking place. Globalisation 
51 Thompson's (2002: 107) reference to William Morris's house 
- 
here symbolising a site of joyful 
and creative artisanal labour. 
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became the byword for those arguing that national economic policymakers were 
constrained in their ability to shape economic policy (Ohmae 1995). The growth in 
international capital movements during the 1980s and 1990s, and the resulting 
increased volatility of the global economic system, was something on which New 
Labour had little critical to say. 
Indeed there was a tendency, uncritically, to accept the view that globalisation 
meant inevitable and highly constraining restrictions on the room for regulatory 
manoeuvre for governments52. In the case of creative industries, this meant that 
concerns about issues such as media ownership, access to distribution chains or 
intellectual property were generally dealt with in a way that was consistent with 
neoliberal, de-regulatory approaches, rather than intervening on behalf of national 
or local firms (Doyle 2002; Garnham 2005; Hesmondhalgh 2005). 
What response there was from New Labour came in the form of a description of the 
knowledge economy that drew heavily on US economists such as Robert Reich 
(Reich 1993). Reich argued that while all other factors of production were mobile, 
high value labour was less so. This belief was to take a particular form in the case of 
the cultural and creative industries, where the importance attributed to 'sense of 
place' combined notions of the role of specific milieu in producing particular cultural 
outputs (O'Connor 2004,2007) with these more knowledge-economy-inflected ideas 
about the competitive advantage of highly skilled labour. The dependence of some 
cultural entrepreneurs on sense of place for inspiration (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999), 
and on localised networks for production, was taken to mean that certain places 
would retain their importance in a globalised cultural economy (Scott 2000). 
Attitudes to work then, and the changing nature of work, are central to 
understanding much of New Labour's attitudes to economic and social policies, 
including its creative industry policies. An efficient labour market was believed to offer 
political success in a variety of areas. At the 'top' of the labour market, enhanced 
human capital53 was seen as the key to improving Britain's economic competiveness 
(Department of Trade and Industry 1998). Throughout the labour market, higher skills 
would be linked to adaptability, helping to produce self-reliant individuals and 
communities, who could cope with the sort of changes that the economy was 
understood to be delivering (Seltzer and Bentley 1999). And at the 'bottom' of society, 
52 See Hirst and Thompson 1999 and Saul 2005 for critiques of this view. 53 The expression 'human capital' is generally taken to mean the stock of skills and knowledge 
required to work and, hence, to produce economic value (Becker 1964). 
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as Ruth Levitas and others have argued (Levitas 1996; Holden 1999), the answer to the 
problems of poverty and social exclusion was viewed as integration into the labour 
market. In this respect, New Labour sought to differentiate itself from the previous 
Conservative government in refusing to tolerate long-term unemployment. 
The notion that economic development was, therefore, a way of tackling social 
problems was built into New Labour's knowledge economy views from the start and 
was to become hugely influential on creative industries policy in terms of its perceived 
ability to contribute to economic regeneration, job creation and regional 
development (DCMS 2000a; London Development Agency 2003). 
5.5 Shaping the new worker: Rights and Responsibilities 
As has been suggested, the notion of a knowledge economy was always broader 
than simply a set of changes occurring in the workplace. Indeed, it was sometimes 
referred to as the 'knowledge society' (Leadbeater 1999) as a way of suggesting not 
only the importance of knowledge in non-market areas, such as public services, but 
also the importance of non-market resources in making society work. Of course, the 
suggestion that capitalism requires social resources to make it work 
- 
trust, integrity, 
ties of community 
- 
that are not generated in the market, but elsewhere, is hardly 
new (Polyani 2001). Both traditional conservative and social democratic politics 
would have acknowledged this. New Labour's version was to argue that these 
resources were best generated not in the traditional communities, beloved of 
conservatives, nor among the working class, trade unions or other versions of social 
democratic community, but in emergent, often workplace-based, networks of 
collaborative individuals (see Oakley 2006). 
The importance of the network idea for New Labour was that it could operate across 
social and economic policy areas and might offer a plausible 'ladder' for upward 
mobility from the disadvantaged and 'excluded' parts of post-1970s society (Christie 
and Perry 1997). The importance of collaborative networking in supporting innovation 
among firms and individuals was already widely acknowledged in accounts of post- 
Fordism (Grandori and Soda 1995; Mingione 1997), but under the influence of US 
thinkers such as Robert Putnam, the role of 'social capital'54 in a wide range of non- 
economic spheres became of keen interest (Putnam 1995). The notion of social 
capital became influential in policy on children and young people (Department for 
54 The term social capital (in Putnam's version) is taken to refer not only to the connections that 
people have but also to the ethical norms that those connections both require and develop. 
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Education and Skills 2003), citizenship (Cabinet Office 1999), volunteering 
(Department for Education and Skills 1999) and neighbourhood renewal (ODPM 2001). 
It influenced employment policy, including the New Deal (Department for Education 
and Employment 2000b), which, along with a subsidy to employers to take on the 
long-term unemployed, offered to connect the unemployed to employed people in 
a sort of mentoring scheme. 
Putnam's argument was that (in the US) membership of a range of associations 
- 
from 
Rotary Clubs to, famously, bowling leagues 
- 
had fallen over the past 25 years; as this 
had implications for the willingness of people to trust others, it could result in a range 
of social problems from declining voting numbers to rising crime. While there was 
some suggestion that data in the UK showed less decline in community involvement 
(Hall 1997), levels of civic involvement among working-class people, and particularly 
the unemployed, were argued to be low 
-a factor increasing their risk of social 
exclusion55. Indeed, changes in the job market or, as one writer put it, 'the 
geographic mobility that Britain's economic restructuring increasingly demands' (Hall 
1997: 37), were seen to be further eroding working-class social capital based on 
locality or trade union membership. 56 In this sense, a knowledge economy that 
demanded that workers were geographically mobile could be seen to be deleterious 
to traditional forms of social capital, which therefore had to be re-invented. 
Connecting people to networks of support and opportunity was thus believed to be a 
legitimate role for the state, and integration into the labour market 
- 
in however 
menial or casual a way 
- 
was viewed as the primary way of doing this (Lister 1998). 
This can be described as the restructuring of the welfare state around an activist and 
even coercive labour market policy. As Harriet Harman57 commented in 1997, 'we 
are reforming the welfare state around the work ethic 
... 
Promoting employability, 
adaptability and inclusion' (quoted in Lister 1998: 220). 
Underlying this stress on the importance of work, therefore, was not only an argument 
about the competitiveness of the economy but the notion that being employable 
could develop skills of adaptability and self-reliance (Barry 2005). The market not only 
required self-reliant individuals, it could also produce them, or as Benn puts it, `New 
55 The term 'social exclusion' was rarely used in UK policy circles prior to the 1997 election, 
which was shortly followed by the establishment of the Social Exclusion Unit. In a UK context, the 
term is generally taken to refer to the multiple aspects of disadvantage 
- 
housing, health, 
education and so on 
- 
as well as to low incomes. 
56 See DeFilippis 2001 for a critique of this argument. 
57 Harriet Harman was at the time Secretary of State for Social Security. 
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Labour's emphasis has been less on the creation of jobs for the citizens-that-exist, than 
on the creation of citizens for the jobs-that-exist' (Benn 2000: 314). 
These re-modelled citizens could then take greater responsibility in a variety of areas 
that had previously been the domain of the national welfare state, including pension 
provision, higher education and even healthcare. 58 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that these responsibilities were, thus, utterly 
individualised; it many cases the notion of the network was invoked to suggest that 
groups of self-organising citizens, aided by public funding, could achieve more than 
state bureaucracies could. This was vital to the idea of 'social entrepreneurship' 
(Nicholls 2006) and to a variety of community projects, from 'self-direction' in health 
(Duffy et al. 2009), 59 transition towns looking to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, 60 to 
social and elderly care (Leadbeater and Lownsborough 2005). 
This thesis argues that part of the attraction of the creative industries for New Labour 
policyrnakers was this role in shaping citizens: entrepreneurial, self-reliant, meritocratic 
in formation and outlook, but strongly networked and thus capable of integrating 
other citizens, even those deemed to be excluded. 
The way that this shaped creative industries policy is the focus of the next section. 
58 For critiques, see Jessop 2002 and Barry 2005. 
59 Duffy et al. 2009, Citizenship in Health, Discussion Paper. 
http: //www. incontrol. org. uk/site/I NCO/U ploadedResources/Citizenship%20! n%20H eaith%202009 
0713%20web. pdf, retrieved 14 December 14 2009. 
60 Transition towns is the name given to a network of towns and cities that are exploring a 
variety of lower carbon ways of living, including housing, transport, waste etc(see transitiontowns. org). 
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6. The knowledge economy becomes creative 
- 
New 
Labour's creative turn 
The previous section argues that the idea of the knowledge economy is central to 
New Labour politics, not just in terms of economics but also in terms of social policy, 
and in the debate about social exclusion. The argument of this thesis is that the 
creative industries are emblematic of this concern with the knowledge economy, 61 
and this section traces how those ideas were manifested in creative industries policy. 
As van Heur says, 
All policy documents on the creative industries are structured by one 
underlying assumption. This is the assumption that creativity will become 
increasingly important in the emerging KBE. 62 Every single document departs 
from this starting point; indeed, the current hype surrounding the creative 
industries is incomprehensible without this (2008: 145). 
In terms of published policy, those looking for theoretical background on the birth of 
the creative industries debate will find it more clearly expressed in the DTI White Paper 
on the knowledge economy (Department of Trade and Industry 1998), or in the 
collection of speeches by the first Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, 63 
published as Creative Britain (Smith 1998), than in the Creative Industries Mapping 
Documents (DCMS 1998,2001 a) with which it is more often associated (Volkerling 
2001). 
In sketching the background of creative industries, this section of the commentary 
draws on some unpublished material which reflects debates within the Arts Council 
England (Brunswick 1997, Hitchen 1997; Putnam and Ellis 1998) in the run up to, and 
61 In saying that we can best understand the creative industries within the context of a 
knowledge economy discourse, I am not of course suggesting that it does not draw, and draw 
heavily, on other discourses. As I argue in Oakley 2009d, the ideas about cultural work reflect 
ideas about the arts that persist from Romanticism, albeit given a knowledge-economy flavour 
in terms of the perceived importance of innovation (see Oakley 2009c). And the supposed link 
between creative industries and social exclusion relies not only on the ideas of integration 
through work (Lister 1998) but also on ideas about democratic popular culture, which had 
informed cultural industries approaches in previous decades (Willis 1990; see also Oakley 2006, 
2009a). 
62 KBE is van Heur's abbreviation for knowledge-based economy. 63 This was the new name for the former Department of National Heritage, renamed in 1997. 
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aftermath of the 1997 election, as well as interviews with policy advisors. 64 In looking 
at implementation, it considers Creative London, one of the largest creative industry 
support programmes (London Development Agency 2003; Foord 2008; Deptford/ 
Greenwich nd). 
In doing so, it analyses some of the themes that fed into the creative industries and 
shaped its implementation. These include the ability of culture to regenerate places 
and its ability to generate employment and hence tackle social exclusion. The 
mechanism through which this would be achieved was again that beloved of New 
Labour thinkers 
- 
the network. 
6.1 'Creativity is for people 
- 
arts for posh people' 
New Labour politicians were sensitive to the claim that the party was obsessed with 
presenting itself as modern. Chris Smith spoke of the complaint that talk of 'Cool 
Britannia' gave the impression that, in cultural terms, New Labour felt 'anything 
modern is good and anything traditional bad' (Smith 1998: 4). 
Instead he defended this as a desire to break down the distinction between 'high' 
and 'popular' culture, which was an issue at the core of cultural industries strategies 
(O'Connor 2009), and one that had pre-occupied arts policymakers in the years 
before the 1997 election (Lewis 1990; Hitchen 1997). 
Since 1994, with the birth of the National Lottery, 65 the arts in the UK had experienced 
something of a boost (Putnam and Ellis 1998). A range of small grants under the 
rubrics of 'Arts 4 Everyone' and 'Arts 4 Everyone Express', together with other schemes, 
had allowed regional arts boards to pursue a range of initiatives, which often 
combined arts practice with wider social policy issues (BOP Consulting 2006; Selwood 
2001). Many regional arts boards saw this as the opportunity to continue work on 
regional or local issues, which articulated a role for culture in responding both to 
industrial decline and to the promise of urban regeneration (Symon and Williams 2002; 
van Heur 2008). 
64 These advisers Included Graham Hitchen, former Policy Director for Arts Council England, and John Newbigin, former Special Advisor to the Rt Hon. Chris Smith, MP, as the Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport. 
65 The National Lottery Act received Royal Assent in October 1993. 
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In doing this they were able to tap into significant non-arts funding sources, such as 
the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
City Challenge, the Urban Programme and the Single Regeneration Budget. For 
many, this meant not only operating across a wider range of policy areas 
- 
arts for 
health or arts in education, for example 
- 
but also with different partners, such as 
small cultural businesses, in what might be deemed popular culture, as well as 
subsidised arts organisations (O'Connor and Gu, forthcoming). 
This blending of commercial and subsided culture, or high and popular culture, had 
not only been part of cultural industries approaches, then, but it was also part of the 
activities of some regional arts bodies and local authorities. Within the Arts Council's 
national office it had both supporters and opponents. As Hughson and Inglis (2001) 
argue, opposition came, initially at least, not primarily from the Left, but from more 
conservative cultural critics. Nevertheless, it was strongly supported by those 
influential on New Labour cultural thinking, such as David Puttnam66 (Puttnam and Ellis 
1998). 
In several Arts Council documents of the period, the vibrancy of the commercial 
cultural world is contrasted with what is perceived to be the precarious state of public 
arts funding. As one discussion paper for the Arts Council's strategy group, prepared 
in November 1997, puts it, 
The state of the arts in Britain in the 1990s is characterised by an apparent 
paradox of, on one hand, financial instability within the public arts sector and 
on the other, thriving commercial success within the wider cultural industries 
(Hitchen 1997: 1). 
While music, design and the fashion industry are described as 'dynamic and 
innovative', the public arts economy is seen as 'highly unstable', heavily under- 
resourced and suffering from personnel problems exacerbated by low pay, weak 
training and development, and lack of career structures (Hitchen 1997). 
The opportunity for the arts was seen as being placed within the wider creative 
industries or creative economy, 67 not only in terms of tapping into the perceived 
66 Puttnam was both a Labour peer (from 1997 onwards) and a founding member of the Arts Council of England's National Lottery panel. 
67 This term was to become popular later in the period under consideration, but was already in 
use in 1997; see Smith 1998, for example. 
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dynamism of the commercial cultural sectors, but also in placing culture at the centre 
of regional development (DCMS 1999a, 2000a). In other words, this enshrined in 
central government policy what some regional arts authorities had been attempting 
to deliver for some time. 
In doing so, it was building on a notion that had informed many cultural industry 
strategies, namely, that a democratic cultural policy could not ignore the fact that 
the culture most people consumed was produced in the market (Greater London 
Council 1985; Garnham 1990; O'Connor 2009). But it conceived of this in typically 
New Labour fashion. Patrician hierarchies of culture must be abandoned, but the 
market-led culture being invoked was not just that of big businesses, but that of 
networked, small firms, embedded within, and thus in some ways taken to be 
representative of, local communities. 
Smith's Creative Britain claimed to be, amongst other things, 'a book about bringing 
democracy to culture' (1998: 2), which he saw as promoting access to a culture that 
had moved beyond distinctions of 'high' and 'low'. Particularly in the context of his 
praise for the vibrancy of commercial culture, Smith seems to suggest a different 
notion of democracy from that of the GLC and other local authorities. As O'Connor 
(2009) argues, this was the notion that inspired cultural industries advocates' required 
public intervention to try and ensure a more democratic culture based on 
embedded local markets. Smith's line, however, echoed by Arts Council documents 
at the time, was in danger of conflating popular culture with democratic culture and, 
therefore, markets with democracy. This notion would have been completely alien to 
cultural industry advocates, who understood that as markets responded to ability to 
pay, which is unequally distributed, it might be necessary to intervene to ensure more 
democratic outcomes. 
It is an argument that we see reflected and intensified in some more recent writing on 
the liberating power of creativity, particularly as embodied in digital technology and 
social networks (Potts et al. 2008). However, Smith's argument was less concerned 
with the potential of new media in allowing consumers to become producers, than 
with placing the subsidised arts sectors not at the side of, or as an alternative to, 
commercial culture, but very much within 'a vibrant, resourceful and robust cultural 
economy' (Hitchen nd: 4). In so doing, it sought to re-legitimate the case for public 
arts funding, without which, Smith argued, we would have 'a very barren civilisation' 
(1998: 18). It also sought to ensure that it was not seen as 'subsidy' for a minority 
interest but as an investment in a growing part of the economy. 
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The difficulty with this argument, and one which much later criticism of New Labour 
creative industries policy stresses (Hesmondhalgh 2002; O'Connor 2009), was not that 
New Labour suggested that the only reason for valuing the arts or creative industries 
was an economic one but that, in stressing its economic role, the historic tensions 
between culture and economy, the arts and commerce, were simply dissolved 
(Oakley 2006,2009c, 2009d). Indeed, in this version, not only was there no tension, 
there was in fact positive synergy: 'the intrinsic cultural value of creativity sits side by 
side with, and acts in synergy with, the economic opportunities that are now opening 
up' (Smith 1998: 26). 
6.2 Creative Industries Policy and social exclusion 
New Labour's answer to those who felt that its creative industries polices stressed 
economic goals above all others was therefore constructed in two separate, but 
inter-related, parts. One, as discussed above, was to argue for the link between 
culture for its own sake and economic opportunity, or, as Smith puts it, 'learning how 
markets can best be helped to produce a synergy between producers, consumers 
and community' (Smith 1998: 103). 
The second was to stress the role of the creative industries in promoting social 
inclusion. This second argument drew directly not only on cultural industry strategies 
but also on the activities of regional arts boards over the previous decades (Chelliah 
1999). 
Social exclusion was firmly within the remit of the DCMS, almost from its creation, and 
certainly after the Policy Action Team (PAT) 10 report (DCMS 1999b). Policy Action 
Teams were set up by the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) to report on particular issues 
relating to social exclusion. PAT 10 was charged with looking at 'how to maximise the 
impact on poor neighbourhoods of Government spending on arts, sport and leisure' 
(DCMS 1999b: 5). 
Many of its recommendations thus concerned themselves with public arts and sports 
spending, but the role of the creative industries in creating employment for young, 
unemployed people was also seen as important. The fact that the creative industries 
could now be termed 'growing industries' meant that they could be explicitly linked 
to regeneration efforts, offering not only new jobs but 'powerful, positive role models 
for those living in deprived neighbourhoods', 'transferable skills' and 'the personal 
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confidence, flexibility and self-reliance on which success in the changing 
employment market increasingly depends' (DCMS 1999b: 29). 
This set the tone for many later creative industry policy documents, both regionally 
and nationally, in stressing not only job opportunities but also the personal 
characteristics associated with success (DCMS 2000a; Fleming 2003; Hartlepool 
Borough Council 2003; London Development Agency 2003; Greater London Authority 
2004; Foord 2008). Yet, consistent with New Labour politics (Driver and Martell 1997; 
Bevir 2005), such personal development was also linked to community benefits. As a 
report entitled Creative Industries: The regional dimension argued (DCMS 2000a), 
while creative activities could both employ and empower individuals, they could also 
help develop 'community spirit' and, indeed, retain 'creative talent' in the regions, 
thus combating the UK's longstanding uneven economic development (see Oakley 
2006). 
6.3 The restructuring of space 
- 
Creative London 
The attempt to use creative industries as a tool of both economic and social 
development is exemplified by the series of measures bundled as Creative London, a 
London Development Agency initiative from about 2003 to 2006.68 Its plan for 
'creative hubs' was specifically aimed at areas of London that combined high levels 
of social and economic deprivation with evidence of creative industry small business 
activity (Foord 2008; Deptford/ Greenwich nd). Initiatives were to be 'particularly 
targeted at disenfranchised groups' and London's 'rich but divided' legacy of social 
polarisation was to be 'actively challenged' (London Development Agency 2003: 15). 
Creative hubs, however, were not simply places where a variety of services for 
creative industry firms could be provided; they also constituted an attempt to create 
a new geography of public agencies within London. Building in some cases on the 
presence and contacts of long-standing community arts organisations (Foord 2008), 
the hubs strategy was an attempt both to bypass existing local authority structures69 
and to give new agencies, particularly those representing community organisations, 
funding to spend on economic development. 
68 1 say 'about' because although Creative London was officially launched, it was not officially 
closed until 2007, but before that its focus was changed dramatically from place-based 
economic development towards the support of specific sectors, such as film or design. 69 The Kings Cross 'hub', Create KX, for example, was on the border of the London boroughs of Camden and Islington. 
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As van Heur (2008) comments, this acknowledged the role in creative industries 
played by non-profit cultural organisations, albeit one that linked them explicitly to 
the notion of wealth creation. But it also represented a particular kind of 'spatial 
selectivity' (Jessop 2002; Brenner 2004) through which public funding privileged 
certain spaces at the expense of others. In the case of Creative London, the spaces 
thus privileged were chosen because they seemed capable of being the next 
creative 'hot spot'. Rather than simply allowing an artistic boom to develop, as had 
happened in the case of Hoxton (Evans 2004; Pratt 2009), 70 there was an explicit 
acknowledgement of the need for spatial redistribution to spread economic activity 
and of the need to mitigate gentrification and displacement, even if the legislative 
tools to do so 
- 
in planning for example 
- 
were insufficient. 
The reason that this could be done, it was believed, was not only that public 
intervention would ensure that some property remained out of the hands of 
developers (Foord 2008), but also that creative industries were intrinsically linked to 
popular culture. Any attempt to expand them would therefore release the talents of, 
in New Labour terminology, the many not the few. 
This is captured, for example, in the description of one of the hubs, 'Creative 
Lewisham', 71 and its plans for the re-development of Deptford. Deptford's ethnically 
diverse population is described here as 'an enormous creative asset', but one that 
was under-capitalised. The document goes on to state, 
This combination of high levels of deprivation, low levels of economic activity, 
and high levels of economically inactive individuals from BME backgrounds, 
points to a challenge and an opportunity for the local Creative Industries 
sector: economic inactivity may be widespread; cultural/ creative inactivity is 
not; much of the cultural/ creative activity might be supported towards 
economic activity (Deptford/ Greenwich nd: 52). 72 
70 Hoxton refers to the area of East London associated with the 'BritArt' boom and its 
associated gentrification. 
71 Lewisham was one of the LDA's 'creative hubs'. 
72 Deptford/Greenwich, nd, Deptford/Greenwich a creative hub: A framework document, 
http: //www. creativelewishomagency, org. uk/documents/DeptfordGreenwichCreativeHub- 
aframeworkdocument. pdf, retrieved 16 December 2009. 
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And, in turn, it was felt that this economic activity would produce 'new, innovative, 
syncretic Creative processes, products and services' in addition to 'advancing 
community relations' (Deptford/ Greenwich nd: 52). 
We can see here New Labour rhetoric about entrepreneurship as distinct from the 
Thatcherite version, in its stress on the importance of collaborative networks (Bevir 
2005). Knowledge economies were seen to demand this sort of collaboration, 
(Leadbeater 1999). But in the case of creative industries, this was combined with 
perceived attachment to place and traditions of popular culture, meaning that 
'creative entrepreneurs may be individualistic, but they were collaborative; they may 
be competitive, but they were 'concerned' (Oakley 2006: 262). 
As a form of the knowledge economy, therefore, creative industries were seen by 
New Labour to deliver on political aspirations across a variety of areas. They offered 
rewards and, in a few cases, fame to the talented and entrepreneurial, thus 
neutralising the appeal of Conservative politics to the aspirational, as the 'New Times' 
thinkers had advocated (Murray 1988). But the skills needed to collaborate in these 
sectors was viewed as more widely beneficial, generating the sort of social capital 
(Putnam 1995) that was felt to be the key to a whole range of social improvement. 
6.4 Good work 
As Banks and Hesmondhalgh have stated, the premise for many creative industry 
support initiatives was that the kind of work provided by the creative industries was 
'inherently progressive' (2009: 416). It combined elements of the knowledge economy 
with 'post-Fordist socialism' (Thompson 2002) in that much of it took place in small, 
highly networked firms. But the nature of the work itself, its connection to older forms 
of craft labour, its association with individual expression and non-alienating 
employment and, in a few cases, with fame and fortune, could all be constructed as 
a story of good, even ideal, work (see Oakley 2009b). 
Indeed there was no lack of support for some of these arguments from workers in the 
creative industries themselves. As various writers have noted, interviews with creative 
workers often reveal a high degree of attachment to work (Throsby and Hollister 2003; 
McRobbie 2006). Gill argues, 'sociologists of work would be hard-pressed to find 
another group of workers who expressed similar levels of passion both for the work 
itself and for the field more generally' (2007: 14). 
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At the same time, the numbers studying subjects such as arts and design at university 
continued to increase. 73 This increase produces its own problems, with high levels of 
part-time and casual work in the sector, and restricted entry points, many of which 
require unpaid work for long periods while people gain the necessary connections 
and experience to apply for paid work (Oakley 2009b, 2009d). 
However, at least until the publication of Creative Britain (DCMS 2008), policy on 
creative industries concerned itself with supporting small businesses and expanding 
related training and education; little attention was paid to conditions of labour. This 
was entirely consistent with other aspects of New Labour's labour market policy, 
where the role of the 'enabling state' was to help people become fit for the labour 
market, not to concern itself with what happened within it (Jessop 2002; Bevis 2005). 
Added to this was Chris Smith's notion of the synergy between creativity and growth 
(Smith 1998). As stated above, the tension between culture and commerce was to 
be dissolved; notions like 'selling out' could be safely discarded, and the historic 
opposition of 'artist' and 'businessman' no longer operated. 74 In part this was simply a 
recognition of the fact that many of those working in small cultural businesses, as 
animators, web-designers, comedy club managers or DJs, were happy to regard 
themselves as small businesses or entrepreneurs, and did not necessarily recognise 
themselves as part of the 'arts' (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999; Banks 2007). 
But from the late 1990s onwards, these ideas were added to by a notion of 'creativity' 
that was independent of specifically cultural activities and was touted as the future 
of employment everywhere (see Oakley et al. 2008; Oakley 2009c). 
As Banaji et al. (2006) discuss, the term 'creativity' performed a wide range of 
discursive functions. It drew on leftist ideas of the 'ordinariness' of creativity (Willis 1990) 
and married this to an economic imperative, suggesting not only that creativity was 
everywhere, but that it had to be if we were to thrive economically. Along the way, it 
also took on board notions of creativity as a social good 
- 
an idea particularly 
important to the influential National Advisory Committee on Creativity and Cultural 
73 According to Creative and Cultural Skills, in 2004/5 there were 180,000 courses in creative 
and cultural fields. There were 31,000 course providers and over half a million students at FE and 
HE level were studying in the sector. In 2005, not taking into account replacement jobs, there 
were only 6,000 new vacancies advertised in the creative and cultural industries. See http: //www. ccskills. org. uk/ind ustrystrategies/Thebigissues/Entrytothesectors/tabid/ 104/Default. a 
spx, retrieved 17 December 2009. 
74 For critiques, see Oakley 2009b and 2009d. 
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Education 
- 
which lead to the formation of the Creative Partnerships initiative in 
schools (Robinson and NACCCE 1999). 
As the first line of the DCMS's report on 'Culture and creativity: the next ten years' 
makes clear, 'Everyone is creative 
... 
Creative skills are necessary for success in all 
areas of life, not just in the world of culture, media and the arts' (2001 c: 5). 
As I argue elsewhere (Oakley 2009c), 'creativity' here becomes a generic skill or 
aptitude, widely required because of its supposed connection with economic 
innovation, on one hand, and personal resilience on the other (Seltzer and Bentley 
1999). This notion was developed in that years' DTI/DfEE joint publication on skills and 
innovation, Opportunity for all in a world of change (2001), 75 and in later years in the 
Cox Review of Creativity in British Business (Cox 2005). 
I have discussed the implications of this broad notion of creativity for cultural policy (in 
Oakley 2009c), but here the point is simply that in dissolving creativity into an 
economic imperative in the development of a knowledge economy, any historic 
notion of the relative autonomy of cultural activities, or of opposition between 
cultural workers and the prevailing political culture, appeared lost (Banks and 
Hesmondhalgh 2009). 
However, this did not mean that the cultural entrepreneurs who were the targets of 
these interventions embraced the language of economic development or 
commerce uncritically (as outlined in Oakley 2009d). As Banks has argued (Banks 
2007: 120), many cultural workers were motivated by 'a convergence of aesthetic 
and socio-ethical' tendencies. For them, economic development did not dissolve all 
tension between the cultural and the economic, any more than the term 'selling out' 
had disappeared from their vocabulary (see Oakley et al. 2008; Oakley 2009d). 
I have argued above that New Labour's understanding of the knowledge economy 
helped inform not only its economic policies but also those in a range of other public 
policy areas. In the case of the creative industries, it fused with notions about the 
nature of creative work and the ability of these sectors to release talent and 
aspiration, which were essential to the New Labour response to Thatcherism. 
75 See Department of Trade and Industry/Department for Education and Employment, Opportunity for all in a changing world, White Paper on Enterprise, Skills and Innovation, London: DTI/DfEE, 2001. 
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Many of my publications, discussed briefly in the section below, are concerned with 
critiquing these assumptions and analysing what happened, particularly in terms of 
the labour market and economic development. The issues that this raises both for 
research and for policy are discussed in Section 8. 
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7. The publications 
This section of the Commentary provides a very brief introduction to the publications 
in Section 9, and seeks to explain the provenance and rationale of each. 
All of these pieces were written as 'stand alone' publications. There is, thus, an 
inevitable degree of repetition. For example, treatment of the shift from cultural to 
creative industries, or the influence of Richard Florida's work, needed to be made on 
various occasions to establish the context for the paper. 
These publications were selected for submission as part of my PhD because they 
discuss the idea of creative industries as it emerged (Oakley 2004a, 2009c), the way it 
was used to develop regional knowledge economies (Oakley 2006,2009a) and the 
specific issues of cultural labour markets (Oakley et al. 2008; Oakley 2009b, 2009d). 
In terms of methodology or approach, the papers range from informal 'commentary' 
pieces (such as Oakley 2004a) to more structured research (Oakley et al. 2008, for 
example). Rather than representing methodological 'development', this simply 
reflects the range of approaches that I have employed over time in consultancy, 
policy and academic work. 
The vagaries of publishing timescales means that published dates do not correspond 
to dates of writing, and hence to the development of the ideas. Given this, I have 
treated the publications in order of writing, not of publication, below. 
7.1 Not So Cool Britannia 
The first of these, Not So Cool Britannia (Oakley 2004a), was born directly out of the 
Demos work (Leadbeater and Oakley 1999,2001) discussed in Section 3.1. This 
originated as a paper given at a symposium at Queensland University of Technology 
(QUT), Brisbane, in December 2002. I was invited as someone who had been 
associated with the development of creative industries policy in the UK, and as a 
practicing consultant, and the paper very much reflects that. It was constructed as 
an opinion piece, setting out what I considered as problems arising in creative 
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industries policy across the UK. These problems are taken up and developed in the 
later publications. 
The paper presented essentially two critiques, one of which might be described as a 
policy critique and reflected my alarm at the 'hijacking' of creative industries policy 
'to support the more dangerous aspects of new economy ideology' (76). By this, I 
meant the idea that this form of economic development appeared to be essentially 
benign, offered 'good work' and could be applied to areas of the country suffering 
from high unemployment and economic decline. While it offered an optimist 
account of the future of work, it seemed to me to neglect underlying conditions of 
social and geographic inequality. 
The second critique was that many of these developments, and the claims that 
supported them, were being taken forward in the face of weak empirical evidence 
about effectiveness or potential impacts. I acknowledged that at the time (in 2002) 
many of these developments were in the early stages, but expressed concern that so 
few long-term research projects were being put in place, especially by a government 
that was, by then, expressing its commitment to evidence-based policymaking 
(Selwood 2002; Pawson 2003; Wells 200476). This point was picked up by later writers, 
for example, Chapain and Comunian, who argued that while there had been a 
variety of mapping and scoping studies over the period, 'there has been no 
consistent assessment of the local and regional dimension of the creative economy' 
(2009: 2). 
Bell (2007) described Not So Cool Britannia as personalised and confessional, which, 
he argued, might be the only way of writing about consultancy work in an academic 
context, given the differences between the two modes of discourse (see Section 3.3, 
above). The advantage of the insider narrative, however, is that one is less likely to be 
dismissed as a 'usual suspect' in making a critical intervention. 77 
7.2 Include us out 
The second publication, Include us out (Oakley 2006), was published in Cultural Trends 
in December 2006. It sets out to explore further some of the contradictions and 
tensions in policy that I had identified in the previous publication, and in particular to 
76 Accessed July 27,2009. 
77 Other critical pieces in the special issue, for example, Miller, Pratt and Couldry's (2004), came from academics better known for taking a sceptical line on the concept of creative industries. 
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scrutinise the attempt to link the goal of greater economic competitiveness and 
enhanced social inclusion through the development of the creative industries. 
The paper describes this as characteristic of an attempt to combine social and 
economic goals, which were turning out to be in conflict, and thus explicitly connects 
creative industries to the politics of New Labour 
-a notion this commentary develops 
further. 
The second part of the paper examines these conflicts as they apply in three areas: 
work and labour markets, the geography of creative industries, and regeneration. The 
two sections on work deal primarily with labour market representation and the links 
between lack of diversity in the workforce and informal recruitment practices. 
At this stage in my writing, these observations were not linked to academic work on 
cultural labour markets, which was to be the theme of later publications. Indeed, they 
suggest, somewhat excessively, that knowledge of these conflicts and contradictions 
is highest among 'creative intermediaries' (Fleming 2004), among whom I number 
consultants, as well as those academics directly involved in these debates via such 
forums as FOCI. 78 The paper would have benefited from an analysis of the academic 
literature on labour markets, though its approach is very much that of a concerned 
practitioner, an 'insider' (as in Oakley 2004a, above). 
The paper explores what one might call the economic geography of the creative 
industries, drawing on secondary data to examine the dominance of London and the 
South East in creative industries and more general knowledge economy employment. 
The work of US economic geographer Richard Florida is considered briefly at the end 
of the paper, a theme that is developed in the next publication (Oakley 2009a). 
7.3 Getting out of place: the mobile creative class takes on the local 
Florida's growing influence on creative industries policy in the UK was becoming 
apparent by the time this paper was written (around 2005/6). His 2002 book, The Rise 
of the Creative Class, was, in academic terms at least, a best-seller. He had 
conducted high-profile speaking engagements in cities such as Manchester, 79 and 
Demos's 'Soho Britain Index' used some of Florida's indicators to rank UK cities in terms 
78 See footnote 18. 
79 For example, Florida appeared with local hero Anthony Wilson, founder of Factory Records, 
at a 'National Competitiveness Summit' in Manchester, October 2005. 
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of 'creative potential' 80 Then-Secretary of State James Purnell referred to the 
importance of Florida's work in his 2005 speech on 'Making Britain the World's 
Creative Hub' (Purnell 2005). 
By the mid-2000s, those of us working as consultants in creative industries had 
become used to clients in local authorities and regional development agencies 
constantly invoking Florida's work. My frustration at this, and at what I felt was the 
inappropriateness of Florida's work for the UK situation, particularly in regional cities 
and towns away from the metropolis, lay behind this publication 81 
The publication developed from a paper given at a symposium on 'Creative Cities; 
Creative Economies' in Shanghai in October 2006. The aim of the symposium was to 
explore the notion of 'creative cities' as they had developed both within and outside 
the European and North American context. I was asked to look in particular at the 
reception and understanding of Florida's work on economic development policy in 
the UK. 
Despite being entitled a 'UK Perspective' the publication surveys international 
receptions of Florida's work. It raises three primary concerns: methodological 
concerns about Florida's indices; questions about the appropriateness of his policy 
prescriptions in a non-US context; and concerns about the political implications of 
adopting a Floridian strategy. The paper continued a concern with the polarising 
nature of this form of economic development, first raised in Oakley 2004a. 
7.4 The Art of Innovation 
The Art of innovation (Oakley et al. 2008) is somewhat different from the other 
submitted publications, partly because it is co-written 82 but more importantly 
because it was a commissioned piece of research designed to look at particular 
issues, and thus it was more 'constrained' in expression than the others. In particular it 
was subject to a fairly rigorous and contested editing process. 
80 See, 'Manchester is Favourite with New Bohemians', Demos Press Release, 27 May 2003, 
http: //www. demos. co. uk/press-releases/bohobdtain. 
81 This paper was written in 2006 but not published until 2009, in Kong and O'Connor 2009. 
821 was the primary researcher on the paper and conducted 35 out of the 40 interviews. I wrote 
the literature review jointly with Brooke Sperry; I wrote the rest of the report while Brooke was in 
charge of the online survey. Andy Pratt acted as an advisor on the project. Co-author 
statements are reproduced in Appendix 1. 
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The work was commissioned by the National Endowment for Science, Technology 
and the Arts (NESTA) as part of a series of research projects concerning the 
relationship between the arts and cultural sectors, and innovation in the economy 
beyond the cultural sectors. This was the only one of the commissioned projects that 
took an essentially qualitative approach to the topic, which was something of a 
struggle, given NESTA's general quantitative research stance 83 
My interest in the project lay primarily in the opportunity to do some in-depth 
interviewing with cultural workers 
- 
in this case fine arts graduates 
- 
working (for the 
most part) in the cultural and creative industries. The interviews conducted for the 
study also provided the material for Oakley 2009d. 
While not endorsing the notion of 'creativity' as an explanation for economic growth, 
the starting point of the study was the fact that many more arts and design 
graduates are being produced in the UK now than in the past. Beyond the expansion 
of the cultural and creative sectors themselves, it sought to explore what, if anything, 
their work within other sectors of the economy could tell us about the changing 
nature of the wider economy. 
The study set out to explore three hypotheses that have been advanced for this 
phenomenon. 84 These included the argument (Lester and More 2004) that those with 
a cultural education are important in 'third generation innovation', 85 due to their 
particular training, their disposal towards critical thinking and their close 
understanding of consumer needs. 
The second hypothesis is that it is the way cultural labour is organised, in small, highly 
networked firms, as well as the less desirable aspects of cultural labour markets (such 
as unpaid work), which makes it a prototype for other forms of work organisation (Ross 
2003). This aspect of the work is more fully discussed in Oakley 2009c and 2009d, as it 
was not an element of the debate that NESTA were particularly interested in pursuing. 
83 See Higgs, Cunningham and Bakhshi 2008 or Stoneman 2009, both of which were 
commissioned at the same time. 
The argument that there is increased absorption simply follows from the fact that there are 
much higher numbers of arts and design graduates than in the past, most of whom find 
employment sooner or later. 
85 Although far from a settled definition, 'third generation innovation' is generally taken to refer 
to the closer relationship between production and consumption. This is most significant in 
technologies like open source software; but even in more traditional production processes, 
users play an increasing role, as in the customisation of high fashion into 'street fashion', which 
is then reproduced by manufacturers, or in the modifying of videogames by users. 
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The final hypothesis is what one might call the 'culturisation' thesis, advanced, among 
others, by Lash and Lury (2007). This argues that cultural products are no longer 
primarily symbolic, but that cultural ideas and images are increasingly a part of non- 
cultural products and services. In a sense, this is a variation of the 'creativity' notion, 
advanced by NESTA and others (e. g., Cox 2005; Cunningham 2006), but it is a more 
complex and subtle version of that argument (see Oakley 2009c). 
The Art of Innovation began with a narrative literature review, which looked at the 
following: how the arts fit within conceptions of the cultural economy, some of the 
literature on cultural labour markets and the careers of arts and design graduates, 
and the literature on the geography of cultural labour. An extended literature review 
was published as a working paper by NESTA in March 2008 (Oakley and Sperry 2008); 
the literature review in the final publication is a greatly edited version of that. 
The findings of the study relating to innovation are not germane to the topic of this 
PhD, so will not be discussed here. The hypothesis about the nature of work is 
developed further in Oakley 2009d. 
The failure to address labour issues fully in the report was criticised by some 
commentators (McRobbie and Folkert 2009), who also suggest that its vocabulary of 
innovation is 'something of a discursive imposition' (24). It would be more accurate to 
say that debates about the nature of innovation (how to define it, whether it is a 
process or an end result, how it can be measured) were among the issues contested 
by authors and client; and this may account for some awkwardness in the phrasing of 
these issues within the report. The report was subject to particularly heavy editing in 
the final stages, and the use of frequent sub-titles (insisted on by NESTA) often serve to 
diminish rather than aid the argument. 
However, the paper does provide evidence for what I have come to see as a 
divergence between policymakers' views of the role of cultural and creative 
industries 
- 
and in particular of notions of 'creativity' abstracted from cultural 
production 
- 
and those of practitioners (2009c: 37). This has implications for the 
attempt, so much a feature of creative industries policy, to dissolve opposition 
between cultural and economic activity, a theme that is picked up by the final three 
publications. 
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7.5 From Bohemia to Britart 
The second publication that drew on the interviews described above is From 
Bohemia to Britart 
- 
Art Students over 50 years (Oakley 2009d). It was first presented at 
a conference on Arts, Culture and the Public Sphere, organised by the European 
Sociological Association (ESA) in Venice, in November 2008. 
The paper explores how, and in what ways, the attitudes of cultural practitioners to 
their work had changed over a period of some 40 years (graduates from the 1960s to 
2000s were interviewed). It drew on the academic literature on cultural labour, an 
analysis of which had been carried out (for Oakley 2009b, published as Art Works, see 
below); but it provided an empirically based view of these debates from the 
perspective of cultural workers themselves. 
From Bohemia to Britart engaged with contemporary debates about the nature of 
cultural labour and its relationship to the idea of 'precarious' labour (Lloyd 2006; 
Mitropoulos 200686; Gill and Pratt 2008; Ross 2009). 87 It questioned the potential for a 
coherent politics of this labour arising from the mix of social and status groups that are 
now precariously employed. In part, this is because of class differences, and in part it 
is because of the distinction that interviewees made between artistic work and 
'other' work, and the privileging of artistic work in their discourse. 
This represents a development of my earlier writing about the kinds of work that the 
cultural sectors produce (Oakley 2004a, 2006) 
-a concern that had extended from 
the polarising nature of the labour market 
- 
and came to encompass the nature of 
work within these sectors. It offers a critical commentary on the ideas of post-Fordist 
socialism discussed in Section 5, above. But it also seeks to explore 
- 
in a context in 
which we are told that there has been a fusion of high and low culture, the arts and 
wider creativity (Smith 1998) 
- 
the ways in which artists themselves continue to make 
distinctions about their work and cultural practice. 
86 Accessed October 27,2008. 
87 Precarious labour is generally understood as casualised or insecure forms of work. 
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7.6 Art Works 
Arts Works was also commissioned, in this instance by the Arts Council's Creative 
Partnerships initiative. 88 However, it was part of a series of literature reviews89 and thus 
allows for, indeed demands, a discursive and critical approach. The series is aimed at 
'concerned professionals', which may be taken to include teachers and arts 
educators, policymakers and funders, as well as interested academics. Editorial 
advice therefore tends to be concerned with comprehensibility for the envisaged 
audience, rather than tone or 'message'. 
The paper draws on academic literature from sociology (Miege 1989; Ryan 1992), 
cultural economics (Throsby 1992; Towse 1992), economic geography (Pratt 2002) 
and cultural studies (McRobbie 2002; Miller et al. 2004), as well as more policy- 
influenced work. In this respect it provides a more comprehensive overview of the 
literature that informs this thesis than any of the other single publications. 
However, as a narrative literature review90 it also concentrates on particular themes, 
including the extent to which cultural work can be seen as a harbinger of other forms 
of work, ideas of precarious labour and self-exploitation, and the implications of these 
themes for debates about the quality of work provided by a 'knowledge economy'. 
The publication concludes with a short debate about the implications for labour 
market policy 
-a subject that informs my current research. 
7.7 The disappearing arts 
The final publication was a long time in development. Earlier versions of it were given 
at the RGS-IBG conference in 2006, and to the Open University in 2008. The paper 
recapitulates some of the arguments presented in earlier papers but interrogates 
more thoroughly what I argue is a non-cultural notion of creativity that dominates 
current policy thinking, and the potential impact of these changes on arts policy, a 
subject which has not specifically featured in earlier publications. 
88 Until 2009 the entire programme was known as Creative Partnerships, though this is now the 
name of a programme under the umbrella of an organisation called Creativity, Culture and Education. It is no longer part of Arts Council England. At the time of commissioning, the 
organisation was known as Creative Partnerships. 
89 Others referenced in this thesis include Banaji et al. 2006 and O'Connor 2007. 901 am here distinguishing between a narrative literature review that, while aiming for 
comprehensiveness, selects publications according to particular themes, as opposed to a 
systematic literature review, which seeks to identify and synthesise all research above a certain quality threshold deemed relevant to the question. 
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The paper traces the shift in policymaker terminology, from 'cultural' to 'creative' and 
from 'creativity' to 'innovation', which has taken place over the years since 1997, and 
argues that this represents a changing set of priorities. The concern with growing the 
creative industries as a part of the economy that animated the Creative Industries 
Taskforce, for example, has been replaced by seeing them largely as an 'input' into 
other parts of the economy and a driver of innovation (Potts et al. 2008). 
This has implications for arts and cultural policy, as well as the creative industries. 
Indeed, I argue that we may be witnessing a breakdown of the approach, which, by 
collapsing the distinction between high and popular culture, sought to develop 
policies for the mixed economy of culture that most consumers inhabit (Lewis 1990). 
The dangers of this are a retreat to a reactionary, high-arts policy on one hand, and 
an 'economic' policy for popular culture 
- 
popular music, videogames, television 
- 
that ignores concerns other than that of growing the market, on the other. 
This final publication suggests that the New Labour policy moment, and possibly the 
discourse of creative industries in its current form, is drawing to a close, a claim that 
seems almost too apposite for the final publication in a thesis of this nature. However, 
even if this is so, as the next section suggests, this leaves a number of research and 
policy questions that still need to be addressed. 
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S. Conclusions 
This final section presents the implications of my work, a brief discussion of what seem 
to me to be the gaps in current academic work and the potential research directions 
arising. 
8.1 The implications of the work 
The commentary and the publications presented here have attempted to 
contextualise creative industries as they are understood and enacted in a UK context 
within the politics of New Labour. The advantage of undertaking a PhD by prior 
publication91 is that one can consider the development of these issues over time 
- 
in 
this case a period of time almost exactly co-terminus with New Labour. By this, I do 
not necessarily mean the period in office, but the period represented by a particular 
understanding and promotion of the knowledge economy. The discourse of the 
knowledge economy has far from disappeared (Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills 2009), but the financial crisis of 2008 has brought a particular political 
moment, one characterised by undiluted faith in markets and particularly in the 
'immaterial' aspects of economic activities, to an end. 
Although my thesis touches on areas of cultural policy, and stresses the links between 
cultural and creative industry polices (see Oakley 2009c), I have tried to avoid what I 
believe to be a common failing in writing about cultural policy, which treats it as 
outside other public policy issues. These include the tendency towards the self- 
referential in cultural policy writing, and an over-statement of the importance of 
purely cultural policies in the production, distribution and consumption of cultural 
products. By contrast, examining the development and dissemination of creative 
industries policy allows us to examine the way the New Labour government sought to 
combine economic, social and cultural goals by introducing a new concept to 
public policy, and by acting as an enabler in bringing together different policy and 
market actors. 
In line with other work on New Labour (Thompson 2002; Finalyson 2003; Bevir 2005), I 
have tried to analyse New Labour politics in the context of its historical years in 
91 It may also be the some for a conventional PhD, depending on the time taken to complete it. 
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opposition to Thatcherism, and consequent development of its own politics as a 
variety of neoliberalism, albeit one with a stronger stress on the importance of social 
networks and the social norms that underlay them. 
I have argued that it was the fatalistic acceptance of its own narrative of the 
knowledge economy which underlay New Labour's approach to creative industries. 
The 'reality' of place-based competition undermined the government's own 
attempts to use creative industry developments to support a more balanced regional 
economy (DCMS 2000a; Oakley 2006). The unwillingness to deal with concentration of 
market power meant that many of the issues of distribution and ownership, central to 
previous cultural industry approaches, were ignored (Garnharn 2005). Its belief in the 
inherently democratic nature of small-business ownership and the liberating power of 
entrepreneurship meant that it paid no attention to the sometimes exploitative 
conditions of creative labour markets (Oakley 2009b, 2009d). 
Later publications have focused on the issues of work in cultural labour markets, 
which I believe to be not only an under-developed area in public policy, but also one 
which offers a promising avenue for future research. 
8.2 Under-researched areas in this field 
Given the small amount of funded academic research on the cultural and creative 
industries, it is not surprising that one can point to a variety of areas that, in an ideal 
world, would be more thoroughly covered. As Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) argue, 
while the cultural and creative industries in their commercial sphere produce 
quantities of market research and tracking data, it is generally not of a sort that can 
be used to inform policymaking or academic research. 
The well-attested problems of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) codes, and the statistical basis for research, means 
that quantitative work in this area can only ever provide a partial account. The DCMS 
Creative Industry Economic Estimates are a case in point, providing a useful overview 
of the development of the sector since 2001, but which, by their own admission, are 
insufficiently robust to be classed as National Statistics (DCMS 2009). 
In addition, there is a scarcity of research that examines the 'full production cycle' of 
culture, taking in the range of activity from idea to manufacture, distribution and 
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consumption. Instead, such work seems to have been rather hijacked by the as yet 
unsuccessful attempts to measure 'creativity' across the economy 92 
Although studies of cultural labour have increased (Oakley 2009b), there remains a 
lack of empirical research in this area. Research on the subsided arts sectors 
undertaken by cultural economists (e. g., Towse 1996; Menger 1999) often examines 
the organisation or management of work (Bilton 2006; Townley and Beech 2010) 
rather than the experiences of workers. Studies of worker experiences tend to be 
directed to the media or new media sectors, perhaps because many of these writers 
come from a cultural studies or cultural industries background, and are thus more 
interested in the media sectors (Gill 2007; Ursell 1998,2000; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 
2008). 
Although there has been some research, largely in the USA, on the links between the 
commercial, not-for-profit and subsidised sectors (Markusen et al. 2006), there is still 
little work on related themes such as volunteering or other forms of not-for-profit work, 
which constitutes a major gap in an area currently the focus of public policy 
attention (DCMS 2008). The'precarify' of cultural work Is not confined to the media 
sectors, yet those In the arts are rarely the focus of research Into precarious labour 
markets. 
I have commented (in Oakley 2004a) on the lack of longitudinal research in the 
creative industries, and indeed almost nothing93 has been put in place since then 
that allows one to track the development of policy initiatives. Scullion and Garcia 
argue that the prevalence of consultancy work in the whole field of cultural policy 
has made it 'difficult to develop a coherent body of research and near impossible to 
develop longitudinal projects' (2005: 122), but it is not clear to me why this should be 
the case. Consultants are no less likely to welcome longitudinal work than academics 
and, indeed, do conduct such research where possible. 94 More likely, the problem 
simply stems from the relative marginality of cultural and creative industries policy 
work within the research funding councils95 and the short-term nature of much 
cultural funding more generally. 
92 See Oakley 2009c for discussion of this. 
93 That is, almost nothing beyond statistical work, like the DCMS Economic Estimates and the GLA's work on London's Creative Industries. 
94 BOP Consulting, for example, is currently undertaking a three-year study of volunteering, funded by the Heritage Lottery Fund. 
95 Funding for academic research in this area falls between the remits of the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), 
and is thus included in the list of areas where the research councils share responsibility. According to their joint statement on subject coverage (AHRC/ESRC nd), Communication, 
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A major gap, particularly in a discourse that has become internationalised 
(Cunningham 2009a), is internationally comparative work. While there is some 
consideration of the globalised discourse of creative industries (Wang 2004; Jürisson 
2007; Prince 2009; van Heur 2008), there is little empirical work that compares actual 
policy development, funding or regulation across nations, 96 or that looks at the 
relationship between the creative industries and allied notions such as the arts, on an 
internationally comparative basis. 
Despite Flew's accusation (2009)97 that the notion of neoliberalism acts as barrier to 
sustained examination of the relationship between culture and the wider economy, I 
would argue that the opposite is the case. Although it is the focus of this commentary, 
hitherto, there is little work that looks at creative industries policy as an aspect of the 
changing modern state, public policy and government. Insufficient research has 
engaged with ideas about changing modes of neoliberal government and placed 
such ideas as the creative industries within them. Despite the current financial and 
environmental crises, what is striking is the continued a-political, or even anti-political, 
nature of much recent writing on the creative industries (Potts 2007; Bakhshi et al. 2009; 
Cunningham 2009b). 98 
8.3 Future research and policy directions 
The above gaps in the literature provide fruitful avenues for future research. The more 
immediate policy question is this: if we are indeed at the end of a particular policy 
moment (Banks and O'Connor 2009), at least in the UK, what does this mean for 
creative industries in terms of future policy development. 
Cultural and Media Studies and Cultural Policy and Management, both of which may touch on 
creative industries, these are 'shared interests' between the two research councils. See AHRC- 
ESRC joint statement (nd) on subject convergence: Interfaces between the Arts and 
Humanities and Social Sciences, at ESRC: Society Today, 
http: //www. esresocietytoday. oc. uk/ESRCinfoCentre/Images/AHRCandESRCstatement final 
version_tcm6-1 6145. pdf, retrieved 08 March 2010. 
96 O'Connor's 2005 work on creative industries in St Petersburg is an exception to this. 
97 T. Flew, 2009, The cultural economy moment? Cultural Science, 
http: //cultural-science. org/joumalfindex. php/culturalscience/issue/view/, retrieved 18 January 
2009. 
98 By a-political, I mean work that treats the market economy as a 'natural' phenomenon, 
rather than the result of a political settlement. As Mirowski (2009) argues, such writers are often 
keen on metaphors from the natural sciences to describe political and economic processes, 
such as the evolution of economic systems (see, for example, Hartley et al. 2008). By 'anti- 
political' I mean work that explicitly treats political critique as an unhelpful barrier to the proper 
engagement of academia with prevailing economic discourse (Flew 2009, see URL, In footnote 
above). 
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I have argued (in Oakley 2009c and Section 7.7, above) here that the distinctiveness 
of creative industries as a policy term may to be lost in the near future as it is 
absorbed into a broader discourse of innovation, on one hand, and an arts discourse, 
on the other. This could return us to an idea of the 'arts' as subsidised activities and 
the technology-driven media sectors as commercial. The significance of this in 
research terms is that attempts to understand the complex ecology of cultural 
production, across market, public and voluntary spheres, which I would argue is the 
way culture is actually produced, may also be endangered. 
Cultural research, always marginal in terms of public funding, is likely to be further 
weakened in an economic climate of overall cuts and re-direction of research funds 
towards science and technology (STEM) subjects (Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills 2009). Those interested in the links between the creative industries and 
innovation are likely to continue to stress that line of argument (Bakhshi et al. 2009), 
and this may offer a way of tapping STEM research funds. The danger of this is that 
while the need for a more critical appraisal of innovation, and one which is less 
deterministic, has never seemed more necessary, 99 those pushing for a 
Schumpeterian approach to innovation studies, and indeed to the creative industries, 
seem unlikely to deliver one (Potts 2007). 
As others have pointed out, creative industries as a discourse is by now truly 
globalised (Cunningham 2009a; Prince 2009). Even if the notion is subject to 
deconstruction in the land of its birth, a concern with the growth of the cultural and 
creative sectors is unlikely to disappear from the policy lexicon altogether. Whether a 
more resource-constrained world can continue to invest in the highly differentiated 
consumerism that so bewitched New Labour policymakers (Hall 1988; Murray 1988) is 
a medium-term question. In the shorter term, policymaker interest in the creative 
industries from Sweden to South Korea (Kong et al. 2006; Power 2009) suggests that 
research will continue to develop which scrutinises the understanding and adoption 
of these notions in different political and economic regimes. It is to be hoped that, in 
addition, it will offer a better understanding of the global distribution of labour and 
consumption in which creative industries are embedded (as, for example, in Miller et 
al. 2004). 
99 See Bullen, Robb and Kenway 2004 and Edgerton 2006, for discussion of further critical 
approaches to innovation. 
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The production and consumption of cultural products, and indeed the links between 
production and consumption, will doubtless be the subject of more empirical work in 
future. It is here, perhaps, that the most serious questions can be asked about the 
degree to which the creative industries constitute a progressive approach towards 
economic development. Should we continue to support these developments, 
without asking questions about conditions of labour and of consumption? The 
ubiquity and sophistication of digital technology is leading to the collapse of 
traditional revenue and business models (Deuze 2007). Can and should we resist 
these changes and, if not, what are the implications for those who work in the 
creative industries? 
But it is also perhaps a good time to return to the questions which animated leftist 
thinkers in the 1980s and earlier. If the promise of post-Fordist socialism (Thompson 
2002) has succeeded in delivering only highly segregated labour markets, what does 
good work in these sectors looks like? How sustainable, environmentally and 
economically, is the expansion of these activities? And what is the geography of that 
expansion? 
This thesis presents what I regard as the current failure of creative industries policy to 
address these questions. Consistent with my background, experience and inclination, 
I have done so not in a spirit of 'pure' critique, but in a manner that seeks to ask these 
questions in the hope that, by addressing them, we can develop a different set of 
political answers. 
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